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I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have seen not only a trade war between China
and the United States involving tariffs on close to $750 billion worth of
goods,1 but also multiple complaints filed by both countries before the
* Copyright © 2022 Peter K. Yu. Regents Professor of Law and Communication and
Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier
versions of this Article were presented at Seton Hall Law Review Symposium entitled
“Intellectual Property and Technology in the New Global Age,” the “TRIPS Agreement at
25” Symposium at Texas A&M University School of Law, the Sixteenth Annual Works-inProgress Intellectual Property (WIPIP) Colloquium at the University of Houston Law
Center, the Seventh Annual Chinese IP Forum at then John Marshall Law School in
Chicago, and the 2018 Asian WTO Research Network Conference at the Faculty of Law
of the University of New South Wales in Australia. He is grateful to Wang Heng and
Arthur Yuan for their kind invitations and hospitality and to the participants of these
events for valuable comments and suggestions. He would also like to thank Wu Wei for
research assistance.
1 See Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War: A Timeline,
CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-chinatrade-war-a-timeline/ (providing a timeline of the tariffs that China and the United
States have imposed as part of the trade war). See generally Peter K. Yu, US-China
Intellectual Property Trade Wars, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE WARS 271 (Zeng Ka &
Liang Wei eds., 2022) (discussing the U.S.-China trade war and recent disputes in the
intellectual property and technology areas); ANGELA HUYUE ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST
EXCEPTIONALISM: HOW THE RISE OF CHINA CHALLENGES GLOBAL REGULATION 203–34 (2021)
(discussing the U.S.-China trade war in the antitrust and regulatory contexts); Henry
Gao, WTO Reform and China: Defining or Defiling the Multilateral Trading System?, 62
HARV. INT’L L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 26–33 (2021) [hereinafter Gao, WTO Reform]
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Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).2 A
key driver behind these ongoing tensions and conflicts concerns the
challenges confronting U.S. technology companies3—both online and
offline.4 Although the inadequate protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in China has been the subject of a perennial
debate since the mid-1980s,5 the recent concerns have raised new

(documenting the U.S.-China trade war); Lee Jyh-an, Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the U.S.China Trade War, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 147 (2020) [hereinafter Lee, Shifting IP
Battlegrounds] (discussing the U.S.-China trade war in the intellectual property context).
2 In chronological order, these complaints include Request for Consultations by
China, United States—Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China III, WTO Doc.
WT/DS587/1 (Sept. 2, 2019); Request for Consultations by China, United States—Tariff
Measures on Certain Goods from China II, WTO Doc. WT/DS565/1 (Aug. 23, 2018);
Request for Consultations by China, United States—Certain Measures Related to
Renewable Energy, WTO Doc. WT/DS563/1 (Aug. 14, 2018); Request for Consultations
by China, United States—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS562/1 (Aug. 14, 2018); Request for Consultations by the
United States, China—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO
Doc. WT/DS558/1 (July 16, 2018); Request for Consultations by China, United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/1 (Apr. 5,
2018); Request for Consultations by China, United States—Tariff Measures on Certain
Goods from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS543/1 (Apr. 4, 2018); Request for Consultations by
the United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Second TRIPS
Complaint].
3 See Alan O. Sykes, The Law and Economics of “Forced” Technology Transfer and Its
Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the U.S.-China Trade War), 13 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 127, 129 (2021) (noting “[t]he centrality of joint venture requirements and
equity caps in the current U.S.-China dispute”); Lee G. Branstetter, China’s Forced
Technology Transfer Problem—and What to Do About It 1 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.,
Pol’y Brief No. 18-13, 2018), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb1813.pdf (“The Trump administration’s trade confrontation with China is occurring on
several fronts, none more crucial than the dispute over China’s alleged misappropriation
of foreign technology.”).
4 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Long and Winding Road to Effective Copyright
Protection in China, 49 PEPP. L. REV. 681 (2022) (discussing the online challenges
confronting U.S. copyright industries).
5 For this Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China, see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the
China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007); Peter
K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the TwentyFirst Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners I];
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in PostWTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners II].
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issues that have been lumped together under the umbrella of “forced
technology transfer.”6
Broadly defined, the term can cover all involuntary forms of
technology transfer,7 ranging from economic espionage to compulsory
licensing and from the mandatory disclosure of trade secrets in
administrative proceedings to the misappropriation of intellectual
property assets through joint ventures.8 Nevertheless, the term’s
definition remains unsettled,9 and some commentators have questioned

For discussions of forced technology transfer, see generally Frederick M. Abbott,
Technology Governance in a Devolved Global Legal Order: Lessons from the China-USA
Strategic Conflict, in A NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 197 (Cheng Chia-Jui ed., 2022) [hereinafter Abbott, Technology Governance];
Frederick M. Abbott, Under the Radar: Reflections on “Forced” Technology Transfer and
the Erosion of Developmental Sovereignty, 69 GRUR INT’L 260 (2020) [hereinafter Abbott,
Under the Radar]; Lee Jyh-an, Forced Technology Transfer in the Case of China, 26 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 324 (2020) [hereinafter Lee, Forced Technology Transfer]; Dan
Prud’homme & Max von Zedtwitz, Managing “Forced” Technology Transfer in Emerging
Markets: The Case of China, 25 J. INT’L MGMT. 100670 (2019) [hereinafter Prud’homme &
von Zedtwitz, Managing “Forced” Technology Transfer]; Dan Prud’homme et al., “Forced
Technology Transfer” Policies: Workings in China and Strategic Implications, 134 TECH.
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 150 (2018); Julia Ya Qin, Forced Technology Transfer and the
US-China Trade War: Implications for International Economic Law, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 743
(2019); Yin Qian, Forced Technology Transfer Performance Requirement in International
Investment Agreements—A Chinese Perspective, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 114 (2022);
Jessica Brum, Note, Technology Transfer and China’s WTO Commitments, 50 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 709 (2019); Branstetter, supra note 3.
7 See Lee, Forced Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 328 (“[Forced technology
transfer] refers to an informal government practice which requires the transfer of
technology from foreign investors as a condition of market access or investment.”);
Prud’homme et al., supra note 6, at 150 (“[Forced technology transfer] policies can be
defined as government policies meant to increase foreign-domestic technology transfer
that simultaneously weaken appropriability of foreign innovations.” (emphasis
omitted)); Qin, supra note 6, at 745 (using the term “to refer to any situation in which
the government requires a foreign firm to share its proprietary information in order to
conduct business in the country”).
8 See Qin, supra note 6, at 745 (distinguishing between “where the transfer is the
result of disclosure of proprietary information compelled by administrative processes”
and “where the transfer is the result of ownership restrictions on foreign investment,
such as mandatory joint venture . . . requirements”).
9 See id. at 744 (“Though widely used, the notion [of forced technology transfer]
lacks a clear definition and is often misunderstood.”); TRADE & AGRIC. DIRECTORATE,
ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES
3 (2019) (“Efforts to target forced technology transfer are complicated by the
sometimes blurred line between voluntary and mutually agreed upon technology
transfer and that perceived to be, or that is in fact, compelled.”); Lee, Forced Technology
Transfer, supra note 6, at 346–49 (discussing the difficulty in distinguishing between
voluntary and forced technology transfer).
6
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the label’s appropriateness.10 Even for those accepting that some
technology has been involuntarily transferred, there remains a vibrant
debate concerning the scale and scope of such transfer and its ultimate
impact on foreign intellectual property rights holders, including those
from the United States.
Because the subject of forced technology transfer has been, until
recently, underexplored in legal literature11—and, for that matter, in
scholarly literature in other fields12—this Article utilizes the forum
provided by this Symposium to weigh in on the debate. To enhance its
analytical focus, the Article closely examines the U.S.-China forced
technology transfer dispute, including the WTO complaint that the
United States filed against China in March 2018.13 It is this Author’s
hope that a better understanding of this topic will illuminate the debate
on intellectual property protection and enforcement in China. Insights
gleaned from this topic will also inform similar disputes within the
WTO14 as well as other U.S.-China trade disputes in the intellectual
property and technology areas.

10 See LAWRENCE J. LAU, THE CHINA-U.S. TRADE WAR AND FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 173
(2019) (“[T]he sharing of technology in a joint venture is a voluntary one. The foreign
direct investor will have to weigh the benefits of having a local joint-venture partner
versus the costs.”); Prud’homme & von Zedtwitz, Managing “Forced” Technology
Transfer, supra note 6, at 2 (“With the important exception of ‘no choice’ policies, foreign
[multinational corporations] have some choice about whether or not they want to
comply with so-called FTT [forced technology transfer] policies; therefore, ‘forced’ may
not be the most accurate word to describe all controversial technology transfer policies
in China.”); Zhou Xiaoming, “Forced Transfer of Technology”: More Myth Than Fact, CHINAUS FOCUS (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/forcedtransfer-of-technology-more-myth-than-fact (stating that “Washington’s accusation is
nothing short of a myth” and that “[i]f there is a ‘forcer’ of technology transfer, it would
be the invisible hand, the market and the compelling forces of competition”); see also
Mark Cohen, Catching up with the Literature on Forced Tech Transfer, CHINA IPR (Feb. 27,
2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019/02/27/catching-up-with-the-literature-on-forcedtech-transfer/ (recounting a webinar organized by Rouse in which speakers discussed
the work-arounds to TIER and questioned whether concerns over forced technology
transfer were a “yesterday’s issue” for practitioners and businesspeople).
11 The literature has been slowly growing, due in large part to the U.S.-China forced
technology transfer dispute. See, e.g., Abbott, Technology Governance, supra note 6;
Abbott, Under the Radar, supra note 6; Lee, Forced Technology Transfer, supra note 6;
Qin, supra note 6; Sykes, supra note 3; Yin, supra note 6; Brum, supra note 6.
12 Outside legal literature, the rare exceptions are Prud’homme & von Zedtwitz,
Managing “Forced” Technology Transfer, supra note 6; Prud’homme et al., supra note 6;
Branstetter, supra note 3.
13 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 2.
14 Like the United States, the European Union filed a complaint against China on
technology transfer measures. See Request for Consultations by the European Union,
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Part II examines the WTO dispute between China and the United
States over the issue of forced technology transfer. It offers a critical
assessment of the complaint filed by the United States, which alleged
violations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights15 (“TRIPS Agreement”). To provide context for this
dispute, Parts III and IV explore the longstanding North-South
technology transfer debate and the more recent debate on the
involuntary disclosure of trade secrets, know-how, and other
proprietary information to combat COVID-19. By providing contextual
reflections, these two Parts highlight the challenges and complexities in
the U.S.-China forced technology transfer dispute. Part V concludes by
offering suggestions on how China and the United States can move
forward constructively from this ongoing dispute.
II. THE WTO DISPUTE
A. The Complaint and Its Aftermath
Even though the inadequate protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in China has been the subject of a perennial
debate since the mid-1980s,16 the U.S.-China forced technology transfer
dispute emerged with the arrival of the Trump administration.17 During
China—Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1 (June
1, 2018) [hereinafter EU Complaint].
15 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
16 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 5, at 140–51 (providing a history of
the tensions and conflicts between China and the United States in the intellectual
property area); see also Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese
Intellectual Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1058–73 (2018) (providing a history
of intellectual property developments in China in the 1980s and 1990s).
17 This dispute is not new, even though it has not received much policy attention
until the past few years. See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 17
(2018) [hereinafter SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT] (noting that the policies and
practices relating to the use of government intervention to transform China into a world
leader in technology “are not necessarily new”); U.S. Tools to Address Chinese Market
Distortions: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2–
4 (2018), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Mark%20Cohen%20uscc%20
testimony.pdf (written testimony of Mark A. Cohen, former Senior Advisor to the
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) (“[F]orced technology transfer . . . was
not a significant topic of discussion in the decade following China’s WTO accession. . . .
Since that time, this dissenting position regarding the discrimination foreigners face in
China’s licensing regime has become the dominant position, as evidenced by the WTO
case filed by the Trump Administration.”); Lee, Forced Technology Transfer, supra note
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the presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump repeatedly blamed
China for the United States’ economic woes.18 Among his key grievances
were trade imbalance, currency manipulation, intellectual property
theft, market access restrictions, and unfair trade practices. Less than a
year after inauguration, the administration quickly launched an

6, at 329–30 (“Despite the fact that the Trump Administration popularized the term FTT,
U.S. laws and documents have used the term officially for almost two decades. The 2002
Trade Act delineates trade negotiating objectives regarding foreign investment,
including ‘reducing or eliminating . . . forced technology transfers, and other
unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments.’” (quoting 19
U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(C))); see also China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and
Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy 5-37, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub.
4226 (May 2011) (Final) (“In China, foreign companies are encouraged to transfer
technology, and it is reportedly difficult to gain the required government approval of a
joint venture without a technology transfer agreement. U.S. Companies may agree to
such requirements as the only way to gain access to China’s large and growing market.”
(footnote omitted)); COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RSCH.,
THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 17 (2013) (“Many foreign businesses came to see the
heightened mandate to import technologies and assimilate them as justification for
greater theft of foreign-generated IP [intellectual property], as well as for stronger
pressure on foreign companies to share technology. An increase in theft and compulsory
technology transfer in fact seems to have been the outcome.”); COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF
AM. INTELL. PROP., NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RSCH., UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 3 (2017)
(noting the “coercive activities by the state designed to force outright IP transfer or give
Chinese entities a better position from which to acquire or steal American IP”). As Lee
Jyh-an explained:
One may wonder why the U.S. has tolerated China’s FTT practices for
almost forty years and has only recently decided to fight against them.
The answer, in part, is due to the considerable challenge in proving FTT.
More importantly, China has become an economic giant whose economic
policies can have a profound impact upon the world economy. The scale
of the problem arising from FTT practices in China, combined with the
country’s significant market power, means that U.S. industries
desperately need their own government to handle this issue. Moreover,
China’s technological developments have threatened the United States’
leading advantage in certain fields. Because the technological and
economic leadership in these fields is closely related to the United States’
national interests, the U.S. cannot treat China as just another developing
country and tolerate the latter’s unfair IP practices, especially FTT,
anymore.
Lee, Forced Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 342–43 (footnotes omitted).
18 See, e.g., Hannah Beech, Donald Trump Talked a Lot About China at the Debate.
Here’s What China Thought About That, TIME (Sept. 27, 2016, 3:24 AM), https://
time.com/4509121/china-presidential-debate-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/; Jeremy
Diamond, Trump: “We Can’t Continue to Allow China to Rape Our Country,” CNN (May 2,
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-china-rape/index.
html; Trump Targets China Trade, Says Plans Serious Measures, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016,
3:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-china/trumptargets-china-trade-says-plans-serious-measures-idUSKCN10Z2JN.
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investigation of China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.19 This
investigation focused on Chinese laws, policies, and practices in the
areas of intellectual property, innovation, and technology
development.20
In March 2018, the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)
released the final report of this investigation.21 The report found that
the relevant Chinese laws, policies, and practices resulted in the unfair
treatment of U.S. firms conducting business in China.22 That report
further accused China of engaging in systematic, state-directed efforts
to steal U.S. trade secrets and other sensitive commercial information
through “cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial networks targeting . . .
U.S. firms.”23 The next day, the USTR filed a WTO complaint against
China based on the findings of the Section 301 investigation report.24
This complaint marked the second time that the United States resorted
to the WTO dispute settlement process to address the inadequate
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.25
19 Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of
Section 301 Investigation of China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section
[hereinafter Section 301 Investigation Press Release]. Section 301 permits the U.S.
President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade
practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–
2420.
20 Section 301 Investigation Press Release, supra note 19.
21 SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17. The USTR provided a substantial
update eight months later. OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING
CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION (2018) [hereinafter SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION UPDATE].
22 See SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 19–61 (discussing the
unfair technology transfer regime for U.S. companies and discriminatory licensing
restrictions in China).
23 As the Section 301 investigation report declared:
For over a decade, the Chinese government has conducted and supported
cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial networks targeting confidential
business information held by U.S. firms. Through these cyber intrusions,
China’s government has gained unauthorized access to a wide range of
commercially-valuable business information, including trade secrets,
technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary
internal communications. These acts, policies, or practices by the Chinese
government are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict
U.S. commerce.
Id. at 153.
24 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 2.
25 The first dispute was China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan.
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The complaint in China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights alleged that “China deprive[d]
foreign intellectual property rights holders of the ability to protect their
intellectual property rights in China as well as freely negotiate marketbased terms in licensing and other technology-related contracts.”26 At
issue were Articles 3 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement.27 Article 3, which
provides for national treatment, prevents countries from discriminating
against foreign authors and inventors.28 Article 28, which focuses on
26, 2009) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report]. The three issues that the WTO panel
examined were (1) the high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the
intellectual property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to properly
dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; and (3) the denial of copyright
protection to works that had not been authorized for publication or dissemination
within China. Id. ¶¶ 2.2–.4. For this Author’s discussions of this dispute, see generally
Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046 (2011) [hereinafter Yu,
TRIPS Enforcement Dispute]; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries,
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011).
26 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 2, at 1.
27 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 3, 28. In addition to the TRIPS provisions,
the report of the Working Party on the Accession of China stated:
The representative of China confirmed that China would only impose,
apply or enforce laws, regulations or measures relating to the transfer of
technology, production processes, or other proprietary knowledge to an
individual or enterprise in its territory that were not inconsistent with the
[TRIPS Agreement] and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (“TRIMs Agreement”). He confirmed that the terms and
conditions of technology transfer, production processes or other
proprietary knowledge, particularly in the context of an investment,
would only require agreement between the parties to the investment.
World Trade Org., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, ¶ 49, WTO Doc.
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001); see also id. ¶ 203 (“The allocation, permission or rights
for importation and investment would not be conditional upon performance
requirements set by national or sub-national authorities, or subject to secondary
conditions covering, for example, . . . the transfer of technology.”); World Trade Org.,
Accession of the People’s Republic of China: Decision of 10 November 2001, ¶ 7.3, WTO
Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (“Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of this
Protocol, China shall ensure that the distribution of import licences, quotas, tariff-rate
quotas, or any other means of approval for importation, the right of importation or
investment by national and sub-national authorities, is not conditioned on . . .
performance requirements of any kind, such as . . . the transfer of technology . . . .”);
SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 8 (listing China’s bilateral
commitments relating to technology transfer from 2010 to 2016). Notwithstanding
these commitments, “China would be . . . liable only if transfer of technology was
attributed to government intervention. If a request for transfer of technology was from
a private entity, China would incur no obligation at all to this effect.” PETROS C. MAVROIDIS
& ANDRÉ SAPIR, CHINA AND THE WTO: WHY MULTILATERALISM STILL MATTERS 97 (2021).
28 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3.1 (“Each Member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions
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patent rights, states explicitly that “[p]atent owners shall . . . have the
right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude
licensing contracts.”29
In its complaint, the United States noted the inconsistencies
between the TRIPS Agreement and two Chinese regulations—namely,
the Regulations on the Administration of the Import and Export of
Technologies (“TIER”)30 and the Regulations for the Implementation of
the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (“EJV Regulations”).31
Article 24 of TIER states: “Where the receiving party to a technology
import contract infringes another person’s lawful rights and interests
by using the technology supplied by the supplying party, the supplying
party shall bear the liability therefore.”32 Article 27 further provides:
“Within the term of validity of a contract for technology import, an
achievement made in improving the technology concerned belongs to
the party making the improvement.”33 In addition, Article 29.3
already provided in . . . the Paris Convention (1967) . . . .”). See generally THE PRINCIPLE OF
NATIONAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TRADE, INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Anselm Kamperman Sanders ed., 2014) (providing a collection of essays
discussing the principle of national treatment in international intellectual property,
trade, and investment laws).
29 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art 28.2.
30 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Import
and Export of Technologies (promulgated by the State Intell. Prop. Off., Dec. 10, 2001,
effective Jan. 1, 2002), translated at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/
cn125en.pdf [hereinafter TIER]. Notably, China issued these regulations the day before
it formally became a WTO member.
31 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 20, 1983,
amended July 22, 2001, effective July 22, 2001), english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.shtml [hereinafter EJV Regulations].
32 TIER, supra note 30, art. 24. The Section 301 investigation report noted that
“[t]his requirement is particularly onerous for small U.S. firms seeking to license
technology, as they typically would not have the expertise or resources necessary to
assess and cover the risk of third party litigation.” SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT,
supra note 17, at 49. Although this assessment is correct, Article 24 was drafted with
transnational corporations, rather than small U.S. firms, in mind. See ELIZABETH CHIENHALE ET AL., COMMERCIALIZATION OF IP RIGHTS IN CHINA 28 (2021) (“TIER . . . was enacted
during a time when the Chinese government thought the small Chinese factories needed
extra protection against giant U.S. companies coming to do business in China.”).
33 TIER, supra note 30, art. 27. As the Section 301 investigation report explained:
Th[e] provisions [in Articles 27 and 29.3] are particularly harmful to a U.S.
licensor if the Chinese licensee makes an improvement severable from the
original invention and then patents the severable improvement in China
or elsewhere. The TIER’s provision on mandatory ownership of
improvements enables the Chinese licensee to enjoy the severable
improvement without the original technology licensed by the U.S. entity
to the Chinese entity, and block the U.S. entity from enjoying the benefit
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stipulates: “A technology import contract shall not contain any [clause]
. . . restricting the receiving party from improving the technology
supplied by the supplying party, or restricting the receiving party from
using the improved technology . . . .”34 Similar to the TIER provisions,
Article 43.4 of the EJV Regulations states that “after the expiry of a
technology transfer agreement, the technology importing party shall
have the right to use the technology continuously.”35
In November 2018, the WTO established a panel to address this
dispute.36 While the panel process was underway, China adopted a new
Foreign Investment Law in March 2019, replacing the Law on SinoForeign Equity Joint Ventures whose implementing regulations were at
issue in this complaint.37 Article 22, in pertinent part, provides:
During the process of foreign investment, the State shall
encourage technology cooperation on the basis of free will and
business rules. Conditions for technology cooperation shall be
determined by all investment parties upon negotiation under
the principle of equity. No administrative department or its

of the severable improvement. The provisions prevent the U.S. entity
from restricting its Chinese licensee from making improvements to the
transferred U.S. technology or from using such improvements in the
market place, including using the improvements to the detriment of the
U.S. licensor.
SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 49. But see MICHAEL BLAKENEY, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 35 (1989) (“[Grantback]
provisions are regarded with hostility where they are imposed without the reciprocal
obligation of the licensor to license improvements to the licensee, since they reinforce
the dominant position of the licensor and have a tendency to stifle the incentive of
licensees to engage in adaptive [research and development].”).
34 TIER, supra note 30, art. 29.3.
35 EJV Regulations, supra note 31, art. 43.4. Compare SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 54 (“This [provision] means that under the [EJV] Regulations,
the Chinese joint venture licensee has the right to use the U.S. licensor’s technology in
perpetuity after the technology contract expires, without paying compensation or
subject to other terms.”), with Dennis Thompson, The UNCTAD Code on Transfer of
Technology, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 311, 325 (1982) (noting that, during the negotiation of
the TOT Code, developing countries “wish to prohibit all restrictions on the use of
technology after the expiration or termination of the arrangement or after the knowhow has lost its secret character independently of the acquiring party”).
36 Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, China—
Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 1, WTO Doc.
WT/DS542/9 (Jan. 17, 2019).
37 Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2019, effective Jan. 1, 2020), translated at https://en.ndrc.
gov.cn/policies/202105/t20210527_1281403.html.
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staff member shall force any transfer of technology by
administrative means.38
A few days later, the State Council also deleted Articles 24.3, 27, and 29
of TIER and Article 43.4 of the EJV Regulations, the administrative
regulations at issue in the WTO dispute.39
In addition, the
Administrative Licensing Law was amended in April 2019.40 Article 31
prohibits administrative bodies and their staff from using technology
transfer as a condition for administrative licensing and from requiring
such transfer in the process of implementing administrative licenses.41
In the wake of these amendments, the United States requested the
WTO panel to suspend its work in June 2019.42 A few months later, the
two countries signed the U.S.-China Economic and Trade Agreement.43
Known widely as the Phase One Agreement, this instrument included
over forty provisions on either intellectual property or technology
transfer measures.44 Although the WTO panel briefly resumed its work
on June 1, 2020, the United States requested the WTO panel to again
suspend its work a week later.45 Because the United States did not
38 Id. art. 22; see also Qin, supra note 6, at 750 (“The reference to ‘forced technology
transfer’ is the first in Chinese legislation. It can be viewed as a gesture of compromise
in the trade war, considering that Beijing has never admitted the existence of the
problem.”).
39 State Council Decision No. 709 (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 2, 2019,
effective Mar. 18, 2019); see also Prud’homme & von Zedtwitz, Managing “Forced”
Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing these changes); Mark Cohen, The
TIER Is Revised, CHINA IPR (Mar. 18, 2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019/03/18/the-tieris-revised/ (same). But see Lee Jyh-an, Technology Transfer, in PETER GANEA ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 482 [hereinafter Lee, Technology Transfer]
(Christopher Heath ed., 2d ed. 2020) (“While China has lifted the absolute ban on grantback clauses in the TIER, it remains unclear under which circumstance grant-back
clauses can be adopted in a licensing agreement. Licensors imposing such a clause as a
trading condition are exposed to a certain degree of risk of antitrust violation.”).
40 Administrative Licensing Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, amended Apr. 23, 2019, effective
Apr. 23, 2019), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201905/64f52a065d3142ae92
d95fa860e2f0e0.shtml (in Chinese).
41 Id. art. 31.
42 Communication from the Panel, China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/10 (June 14, 2019).
43 Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., Jan. 15, 2020,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/
Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf.
44 Id. chs. 1–2.
45 Communication from the Panel, China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/14 (June 22, 2020).

YU (DO NOT DELETE)

1014

4/8/22 10:57 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1003

request the panel to resume its work within twelve months, the panel’s
authority lapsed in June 2021.46
B. Preliminary Analysis
In view of the latest developments surrounding the U.S.-China
forced technology transfer dispute, it is unlikely that the WTO panel will
have an opportunity to weigh in on this dispute. Nevertheless, the
European Union filed a similar but broader complaint more than two
months after the U.S. complaint,47 and the United States remains part of
the consultations surrounding that complaint.48 Regardless of the status
of both complaints, it will be worthwhile to undertake a preliminary
analysis of the U.S. complaint to highlight the challenges and
complexities in the U.S.-China forced technology transfer dispute.
To begin with, Articles 24, 27, and 29 of TIER covered issues
relating to indemnification and improvement, both highly technical
issues on which the TRIPS negotiators had not reached consensus and
most likely had not deliberated.49 While the word “improvement” is
nowhere to be found in the TRIPS Agreement, the word
“indemnification” appears in only unrelated provisions in the
enforcement section—namely, the provisions on the indemnification of
the defendant upon abuse of enforcement procedures50 and the
See Lapse of Authority for the Establishment of the Panel, China—Certain
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/
DS542/15 (June 11, 2021) (“Following resumption on 1 June 2020, the work of the Panel
was suspended again, pursuant to Article 12.12, at the request of the United States, on 8
June 2020 (WT/DS542/14). The Panel has not been requested to resume its work, and
pursuant to Article 12.12 of the DSU, the authority for the establishment of the Panel has
lapsed.”); see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 12.12, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (“The panel may suspend its work at any time at the
request of the complaining party for a period not to exceed 12 months. . . . If the work
of the panel has been suspended for more than 12 months, the authority for
establishment of the panel shall lapse.”).
47 EU Complaint, supra note 14.
48 Request to Join Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures on
the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/7 (Jan. 21, 2019).
49 The text of the TRIPS Agreement does not indicate any discussion of these specific
issues, nor is this Author aware of any such discussion during the TRIPS negotiations.
In addition, the TRIPS negotiators were not interested in deliberating on issues that
might arise in the future. See David Fitzpatrick, Negotiating for Hong Kong, in THE MAKING
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 285,
287 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (“The [TRIPS] negotiators did not
indulge in futurology.”).
50 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 48.1 (“The judicial authorities shall have
the authority to order a party at whose request measures were taken and who has
46
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indemnification of the importer, consignee, or owner of wrongfully
detained intellectual property goods.51
The strongest argument that the United States could marshal
concerns the fact that TIER applied only to imported and exported
technology. Because such application is facially discriminatory and
potentially trade-distorting, the United States will be in a good position
to persuade the WTO panel that the regulation “accord[ed] less
favorable treatment to foreign intellectual property rights holders as
compared to Chinese intellectual property rights holders.”52
Nevertheless, China could counterargue that the highly technical issues
of indemnification and improvements in relation to technology
importation and exportation fall outside the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement.
Ironically, the first case53 in which the WTO panel determined
whether a member state had complied with Article 3 of the TRIPS
Agreement brought back an earlier complaint that the European
Economic Community filed against the United States under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) about the latter’s failure to
accord national treatment to foreign intellectual property rights
holders.54 United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930—“[t]he
only GATT panel report that squarely addressed intellectual property
law”55—involved the inconsistencies between Article III:4 of GATT and
an earlier version of Section 337 of the 1930 Trade Act.56 That
challenged provision allowed the U.S. International Trade Commission
to investigate claims of unfair import practices and to issue exclusion
orders that would prevent the U.S. entry of the relevant imports.57 The
abused enforcement procedures to provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained
adequate compensation for the injury suffered because of such abuse.”).
51 See id. art. 56 (“Relevant authorities shall have the authority to order the applicant
to pay the importer, the consignee and the owner of the goods appropriate
compensation for any injury caused to them through the wrongful detention of goods or
through the detention of goods released pursuant to Article 55.”).
52 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
53 Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶
8.130, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/R (adopted Aug. 6, 2001).
54 Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc.
L/6439-36S/345 (adopted Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter GATT Panel Report]; see also
Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist—An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 76–78 (2008) (discussing this
report and the subsequent reform).
55 MATTHEW KENNEDY, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: APPLYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARDS IN A TRADE LAW FRAMEWORK 21 (2018).
56 GATT Panel Report, supra note 54, ¶ 3.1.
57 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
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concerns of the European Economic Community about the protectionist
nature of Section 337 and the possibility of unfair advantage is not that
different from the United States’ concerns in the present forced
technology transfer dispute with China. In the end, the GATT panel
found that the U.S. provision “accord[ed] to imported products alleged
to infringe United States patents treatment less favourable than that
accorded under federal district court procedures to like products of
United States origin.”58
Compared with TIER, the claims against the EJV Regulations are
weaker, especially when one takes the view that China did not force U.S.
companies to form equity joint ventures. To be fair, some sectors, such
as those involving high-speed rail, new energy vehicles, and other
frontier technologies, were unavailable to these companies unless they
teamed up with local joint venture partners.59 Nevertheless, if the
United States is to prevail in this dispute, it will have to show that the
Regulations were inconsistent with China’s commitments at the WTO.
After all, it is not uncommon for governments, including the U.S.
government, to prevent foreign companies from entering a certain part
of the domestic market due to national security or other reasons.60 The
GATT Panel Report, supra note 54, ¶ 5.20.
As Dan Prud’homme and Max von Zedtwitz observed:
Our interviews revealed that perhaps the most well-known requirements
imposed on foreign firms to transfer their technology to a foreign-Sino JV
[joint venture] as a precondition for market access (e.g., a business
license) and/or access to state support (e.g., public procurement and
other financial resources) in China were in the traditional auto industry
and high-speed trains industry. Similar requirements were reported in
other industries such as the big-power-generation turbines industry and,
most recently, the new energy vehicles (NEV) industry. Other state
policies were reported to directly or indirectly require transfer of
technology as a precondition for market access, such as (the now revised)
local content requirements for operating in and winning government
procurement contracts in the wind turbine industry, among other foreign
investment restrictions.
Prud’homme & von Zedtwitz, Managing “Forced” Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 7
(footnotes omitted); see also Lee, Technology Transfer, supra note 39, at 464–66
(discussing foreign ownership restrictions in China); Lee, Forced Technology Transfer,
supra note 6, at 335–36 (discussing the joint venture restrictions in China); Prud’homme
et al., supra note 6, at 164 (noting that foreign firms have encountered significant
pressure to transfer advanced technology in China owing to policies that called for
“technology transfer for market access via JVs in the high-speed rail industry” or that
introduced “requirements for critical NEV technology to be transferred to JVs as a
condition for obtaining NEV production licenses”).
60 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 5, at 902–03 (discussing the failed
bid of China’s state-run CNOOC Ltd. to acquire the California-based Unocal oil company);
Vinod K. Aggarwal & Andrew W. Reddie, Regulators Join Tech Rivalry with National58
59
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WTO rules do not give these companies an entitlement to operate in a
member state.
Moreover, these rules do not prohibit the introduction and
utilization of ownership restrictions in foreign investment, except in
select areas. As Julia Qin explained:
[T]here is no general principle of international law prohibiting
governments from imposing ownership restrictions on
foreign investment. Thus, China is not generally prevented
from limiting foreign ownership except where it has made
specific treaty commitments, such as in the service sectors
under [the General Agreement on Trade in Services] and in the
automotive industry under its WTO accession protocol.61
Indeed, issues relating to ownership restrictions are usually governed
by investment agreements.62 In the mid-1990s, the developed country
Security Blocks on Cross-Border Investment, GLOBALASIA (Mar. 2019), https://
www.globalasia.org/v14no1/cover/regulators-join-tech-rivalry-with-nationalsecurity-blocks-on-cross-border-investment_vinod-k-aggarwalandrew-w-reddie
(discussing national security reviews of foreign direct investments in the United States,
the Andean Community, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, other members
of the European Union, and China); Frank J. Cilluffo & Sharon L. Cardash, What’s Wrong
with Huawei, and Why Are Countries Banning the Chinese Telecommunications Firm?,
CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2018, 6:44 AM), https://theconversation.com/whats-wrongwith-huawei-and-why-are-countries-banning-the-chinese-telecommunications-firm109036 (discussing the bans in multiple countries on the government use of
telecommunications equipment developed by Huawei Technology).
61 Qin, supra note 6, at 746.
62 As Julia Qin observed:
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the first treaty to
restrict performance requirements. Its investment chapter prohibits
seven types of performance requirements, including the requirement to
“transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary
knowledge” to a person in the host country, in connection with the
establishment or operation of foreign investment. Similar clauses have
since entered all free trade agreements . . . negotiated by the USA, as well
as the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty . . . . A number of non-US
FTAs have also restricted performance requirements, including those
concluded by Canada, EU, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea
that specifically prohibit the requirement of technology transfer. More
significantly, the largest multilateral FTA to date—the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership . . . —contains
elaborate provisions on performance requirements, including a broad
restriction on the requirement of technology transfer.
Id. at 753 (footnotes omitted); see also Abbott, Technology Governance, supra note 6, at
211 (“The WTO Agreements, including the TRIPS Agreement, are not ‘investment
agreements’, and USTR’s allegations are addressed to conditions imposed on ‘direct
investors’, including as joint venture partners.”); Mark Wu, Export Policies, Technology
Controls, and Investment Reviews: How States Compete in the Era of Global High-Tech
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members of the WTO sought to develop a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment under the auspices of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), but that proposed agreement
failed in the end.63 As Petros Mavroidis and André Sapir declared in
their recent book: “The GATT and similar multilateral agreements
regulating trade in goods do not cover investment and as a result do not
address transfer of technology as a precondition for opening up to
investment.”64 Likewise, Frederick Abbott observed, “[i]f the WTO
Agreements already had covered investment subject matter, there
would have been no apparent incentive for negotiating [this new
multilateral agreement].”65
As if these challenges were not difficult enough, Article 40.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement expressly recognizes that “some licensing practices or
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain
competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the
transfer and dissemination of technology.”66 Article 40.2 further
provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from
specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions
that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt,
consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement,
appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices,
which may include for example exclusive grantback
Value Chains, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 90, 97–100
(Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Wu, Export Policies] (discussing technology
transfer as a condition for investment approval). Interestingly, “none of the investment
agreements have categorized mandatory JV as one of the performance requirements to
be eliminated.” Qin, supra note 6, at 753. See generally Peter K. Yu, The InvestmentRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017) (discussing
international agreements covering issues at the intersection of intellectual property and
investment).
63 For discussions of the origin and failure of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, see generally Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution
in Search of a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77 (2003); Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise
and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT’L LAW. 1033
(2000); James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and
Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 769, 804–31 (2000).
64 MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 27, at 60.
65 Abbott, Under the Radar, supra note 6, at 262.
66 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 40.1.
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conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and
coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws
and regulations of that Member.67
In addition, Article 7 includes “the transfer and dissemination of
technology” as one of the five objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.68
Article 8.2 further provides: “Appropriate measures, provided that they
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely
affect the international transfer of technology.”69
Taken together, the above-mentioned TRIPS provisions provide
support for China’s defense in the dispute, especially when one takes
into account the aim of both TIER and the EJV Regulations to prevent
transnational corporations from using technology contracts to “impede
the transfer and dissemination of technology” in China.70 It is worth
recalling that the use of restrictive clauses in technology contracts by
these corporations was highly controversial in the run-up to the TRIPS
negotiations.71 Chapter 4 of the draft International Code of Conduct on
the Transfer of Technology (“TOT Code”),72 which Part III will discuss in
greater detail,73 provided an express list of problematic restrictive
technology licensing clauses, including those relating to grantbacks,
exclusive dealing, restrictions on adaptations, and restrictions after
expirations of arrangements.74 Developed under the auspices of the
Id. art. 40.2.
Id. art. 7; see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1000–08 (2009) (discussing Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement).
69 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 8.2.
70 Id. art. 40.1.
71 For discussions of the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, see generally BLAKENEY, supra note 33, at 131–61; INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE
OF CONDUCT (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER]; SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH–SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTITRUST 79–106 (1998); Peter K. Yu, International Technology Contracts,
Restrictive Covenants and the UNCTAD Code, in EMPLOYEES, TRADE SECRETS AND RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS 41 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2017)
[hereinafter Yu, International Technology Contracts]; Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two
Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 493–505 (2009) [hereinafter Yu,
Development Agendas].
72 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc.
TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 144–155.
74 See SELL, supra note 71, at 93 (providing the list of restrictive business practices
covered in the draft Code).
67
68
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), this
draft Code included language that eventually found its way to Article 40
of the TRIPS Agreement.75
In the developing world, it is not uncommon to find countries
embracing “technology transfer for market access” policies—a
longstanding practice that dates back decades.76 As Lee Jyn-an
observed:
Technology transfer has been an important approach in many
countries in fostering economic growth and catching up
technological development with others. The recent economic
development in China provides an example of how a country
can benefit from foreign technologies as a host of foreign
investment. While host countries have various policies
fostering technology transfers from foreign companies, it
remains a policy puzzle to what extent a government can
induce these technology transfers by granting market access
to foreign companies. [Forced technology transfer] is
normally imposed as the condition of market access. In fact,
this practice originates from a quid pro quo policy toward
multinational enterprises to transfer technology in exchange
for market access. This “trade-technology-for-market” policy
was fairly popular in developing countries in the 1970s, and
has existed in China since the Deng Xiaoping administration of
See infra text accompanying notes 158–159.
See Thomas J. Holmes et al., Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market
Access in China, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1154, 1154 (2015) (“By the 1970s, quid pro quo
policy, which requires multinational firms to transfer technology in return for market
access, had become a common practice in many developing countries.”); Lee, Forced
Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 340–43 (discussing “market for technology”
policies); Qin, supra note 6, at 752 (“Performance requirements have been widely used,
especially by developing countries, as a tool to manage [foreign direct investment] for
achieving certain policy objectives. Examples of commonly used performance
requirements include . . . transferring technology to the country . . . and forming JVs with
local partners.”); see also Abbott, Under the Radar, supra note 6, at 260 (“China has a
number of unique characteristics and its approach to foreign direct investment and
technology transfer may not be the optimal approach for other developing and/or
emerging market countries. But whether technology transfer requirements are
‘optimal’, or a second or third best, this does not argue for taking them out of the toolkit
for developing countries.” (footnote omitted)); Jeff Spross, China’s Forced Technology
Transfer Is Actually a Pretty Good Idea, WEEK (Apr. 1, 2019), https://theweek.com/
articles/831859/chinas-forced-technology-transfer-actually-pretty-good-idea
(“Whether China itself, now the world’s second-largest economy, still needs to rely on
forced technology transfer is debatable. But lots of other countries do need to build
themselves up the way China has.”). See generally Holmes et al., supra (assessing the
impact of China’s “technology transfer for market access” policies).
75
76
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the early 1980s. Some countries, such as Brazil, Japan, and
South Korea, had similar policies in place to restrict direct
foreign investment and to access foreign technologies.77
Focusing on developing countries in general, Frederick Abbott
concurred:
Government requirements on foreign investors to partner
with local enterprises as a condition of foreign direct
investment has been a common feature of national laws
throughout much of the developing and emerging market
world both before and after entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. In that regard, it is difficult to envision a
successful claim that joint venture requirements as such
contravene the rules of the WTO. Licensing of technology to a
joint venture is a natural feature of such an arrangement. If
government rules regarding joint ventures apply in equal
measure to local and foreign entities, there is not much space
for arguing that such rules contravene the TRIPS Agreement
. . . . Even if such rules apply only to foreign investors seeking
approval to enter the market, an argument for TRIPS
inconsistency is attenuated.78
More interesting from a standpoint of U.S.-China relations,
transferring technology from the United States to China has not always
been considered harmful. In 1987, a few years after China adopted its
first trademark and patent laws, the now-defunct Office of Technology
Assessment of U.S. Congress completed a comprehensive study of the
transfer of technology from the United States and other countries to
China.79 In addition to drawbacks, the report identified the following
strategic benefits of greater technology transfers to China:
The United States benefits insofar as China is a strategic asset,
if not an ally, in the global competition with the Soviet Union.
Technology transfer helps build these ties and increases
China’s strength [vis-à-vis] the Soviet Union. It also can lead
to important commercial ties and to the export of American
products. In addition, China is still a very poor country, and
technology transfer can be an important element in
humanitarian efforts to help a billion people move out of
poverty.80
77
78
79
80

Lee, Forced Technology Transfer, supra note 6, at 340–41 (footnotes omitted).
Abbott, Under the Radar, supra note 6, at 261–62 (footnote omitted).
OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISC-340, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO CHINA (1987).
Id. at 3.
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Although today’s China is no longer the “very poor country” mentioned
in this report, the quoted excerpt does indicate both the strategic
dimension and beneficial aspects of international transfer of
technology.81
Finally, it will be difficult for WTO panelists or other outsiders to
assess the fairness of the pricing involved in technology contracts. To
be sure, TIER and the EJV Regulations enabled Chinese companies to
negotiate technology licenses in their shadow. One could therefore
argue that the regulations gave these companies an unfair advantage
over their foreign counterparts.82 Lee Branstetter went even further to
81 Id. The policy shift relating to China reminds us of a similar policy shift involving
Japan. Even though the United States actively persuaded other countries to extend GATT
membership to Japan, its attitude dramatically changed after the rise of the Japanese
economy. MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 27, at 128. As Professors Mavroidis and Sapir
observed:
The irony is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, after becoming an economic
powerhouse, Japan’s primary (but not only) critic was its original
benefactor, the United States. The U.S. government accused Japan of
unfair trade practices, and, as a result, Japan found itself on the receiving
end of various trade sanctions.
Id.
82 See Prud’homme et al., supra note 6, at 151 (“The Chinese state institutes FTT
policies in an attempt to shift the bargaining power in commercial transactions from
foreign to Chinese firms.”); Sykes, supra note 3, at 129 (“Potential Chinese investment
partners use these requirements as negotiating leverage to secure technology transfer
agreements—would-be foreign investors often complain that they are played off against
each other when negotiating for entry into the Chinese market, eventually capitulating
to demands for technology transfer agreements lest a refusal result in the business
opportunity going to a competitor.”). As Julia Qin explained:
In the view of Western critics, . . . the transfer of technology compelled by
the market-for-technology policy is not truly “voluntary” in nature, but
rather the outcome of “a de facto cartel” organized by the Chinese
government, in which “Chinese purchasers collude to expropriate key
technologies” from foreign suppliers. According to this view, the practice
amounts to unfair competition in the marketplace. From the perspective
of economic theory, when China demands a tradeoff between market
access and technology transfer, it behaves as monopsony, that is, it has the
power of a single buyer with a substantial control over the market in
which there are many would-be foreign sellers. Like monopoly power on
the supply side, monopsony power on the demand side can produce
economic harm. Where there is monopsony, the price of input tends to be
depressed below the competitive level, resulting in a decrease in the
overall quantity of the input produced. Thus, the market-for-technology
policy may have deterred foreign firms from investing or operating in
China at the optimal level. In the long run, the policy may also harm the
broader global economy in that it may tilt the playing field in favor of less
innovative Chinese firms in the global technology market, thereby limiting
the resources flowing to the world’s most innovative firms.
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describe the regulations as “a subsidy of a less innovative domestic firm
and a de facto tax on the foreign enterprise.”83 Nevertheless, both TIER
and the EJV Regulations have been in force for close to two decades
before the WTO complaint.84 As a result, any U.S. business entering the
Chinese market has likely been advised of the unique local regulatory
environment, including not only TIER and the EJV Regulations, but also
other laws, policies, and practices that differ from those of the United
States. Thus, to the extent that the WTO panel pays attention to the
impairment of the complainant’s legitimate expectations, the United
States does not have a strong claim.
Moreover, because the WTO complaint was framed in terms of lost
patent rights, the analysis is not straightforward. When the technology
contract was to expire, Article 43.4 of the EJV Regulations did not revoke
the patent rights held by the U.S. joint venture partner. Instead, the
provision granted the local joint venture a nonexclusive license to
continue to use the licensed technology after the expiration of the
contract.85 Although the USTR took the position that such a grant
“effectively deprive[d] U.S. companies of the full value of their
[intellectual property] and technology and inhibit[ed] them from fairly
competing in the large China market,”86 whether that grant was
impermissible under the TRIPS Agreement remains to be seen. As
Frederick Abbott reminded us: “[t]he TRIPS Agreement requires that
WTO Members allow patent holders to license their patented
technologies, but it does not establish rules regarding the terms of such
transfers except in the context of reference to potentially
anticompetitive licensing practices.”87 As noted earlier, the WTO panel
will have great difficulty determining whether the pricing in the
relevant technology contracts have already covered this type of
nonexclusive license.88

Qin, supra note 6, at 756 (footnote omitted). But see id. at 757 (“[W]hen government
monopsony confronts IP monopolies, it is possible that their anticompetitive effects may
offset each other at least to some extent.”).
83 Branstetter, supra note 3, at 4.
84 EJV Regulations, supra note 31; TIER, supra note 30.
85 See EJV Regulations, supra note 31, art. 43.4 (stating that “after the expiry of a
technology transfer agreement, the technology importing party shall have the right to
use the technology continuously”).
86 SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17, at 46.
87 Abbott, Under the Radar, supra note 6, at 261 (footnote omitted).
88 See supra text accompanying note 82.
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In sum, the United States, which bears the burden of proof,89 has
faced considerable challenges in the WTO dispute settlement process.90
Compared with the first U.S.-China TRIPS dispute in the late 2000s,
whose outcome was split somewhat equally between the two parties,91
this complaint seems to be much weaker. Thus, for U.S. rights holders,
it may be a blessing in disguise that the USTR did not push hard to get
the dispute resolved before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Even
though the WTO panel could again split the outcome by allowing both
parties to score some important points,92 any decision that the panel
issues will likely provide some helpful language for those advocating for
greater transfer of technology from developed to developing countries.
Should the United States lose the dispute, the case will set—from the
standpoint of U.S. rights holders—an undesirable precedent supporting
international demands for such transfer.
89 See Legal Issues Arising in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c10s6p1_e.ht
m (last visited Jan. 13, 2022) (discussing the allocation of the burden of proof in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings); see also SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note
17, at 19 (“[A]ccording to numerous sources, China’s technology transfer policies and
practices have become more implicit, often carried out through oral instructions and
‘behind closed doors.’”); PAUL BLUSTEIN, SCHISM: CHINA, AMERICA AND THE FRACTURING OF THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 133 (2019) (“The evidence of forced [technology] transfers for
market access can best be described as circumstantial.”); MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note
27, at 53 (raising questions about “the evidentiary requirements that must be met for a
complainant to show that collective refusal to enter into joint ventures absent of
[technology transfer] is the result of state interference that China promised to
eradicate”); Wu, Export Policies, supra note 62, at 100–03 (discussing the informal
linkages between technology transfer and government action, including in the area of
government procurement); Lu Zhiyao (Lucy) & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Section 301: US
Investigates Allegations of Forced Technology Transfers to China, E. ASIA F. (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/03/section-301-us-investigatesallegations-of-forced-technology-transfers-to-china/ (noting that the standard of proof
will be one of the two obstacles that the United States will face should it bring a case to
the WTO).
90 Professors Mavroidis and Sapir suggested that “with respect to . . . forced
[technology transfer], China can be accused of violating the spirit but not necessarily the
letter of the WTO.” MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 27, at 160. Nevertheless, “one can only
litigate at the WTO against the application of the written rules, not their spirit.” Id. at
viii.
91 See WTO Panel Report, supra note 25, ¶ 8.1 (finding for China on the criminal
threshold claim, holding for the United States on the formalities claim, and splitting the
claim on customs measures between the two parties); see also Yu, TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 25, at 1082 (noting that both parties had seemingly secured a 2-1
victory and that neither side chose to appeal the decision).
92 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Contents, 60 IDEA 149, 209 (2020) (“[A]s we have
seen in both the TRIPS negotiations and WTO panel decisions, splitting [in] the middle
seems to be quite popular among those involved in the international trading body.”).
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III. THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE93
To help contextualize the U.S.-China forced technology transfer
dispute, it will be helpful to revisit the North-South technology transfer
debate, which goes back at least more than half a century and long
before China joined the WTO in December 2001.94 Shortly after the
beginning of the decolonization movement following the Second World
War, the newly independent countries, virtually all of which were in the
developing world,95 began expressing concern about whether the
existing international intellectual property rules were biased toward
the interests of colonial powers.96 A key question for these countries
93 The discussion of the Stockholm Protocol to the Berne Convention and the
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology in this Part was adapted
from Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71.
94 China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. Press
Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession
(Nov. 10, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm.
95 As this Author noted in an earlier book chapter:
Until the 1950s and 1960s, many developing countries remained colonies,
dependencies or protectorates of European powers. As a result, they not
only were economically poor and technologically backward, but also had
very limited freedom to freely negotiate for international technology
contracts that would strengthen their human capital and technological
capabilities.
Yu, International Technology Contracts, supra note 71, at 43.
96 As Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg explained the different objectives underlying
the development of the Berne Convention:
The Convention is essentially concerned with the private interests of
authors, and with raising the level of protection that is accorded to them.
Such questions are not usually of great significance to developing
countries. These are at varying stages of economic development, with the
consequences that the standard of living of their populations is generally
much lower than that found in the developed countries. Economic
development, even where this means no more than the attainment of a
basic level of self-sufficiency, is therefore an overriding goal for these
countries. Ways of achieving this object are through the promotion of
literacy and through technical and vocational training, and these
programmes, in turn, necessitate ready access to a wide range of
educational and informational materials.
The authors and
publisher/providers of many of these works, however, will usually be
resident in one of the developed countries, and the works themselves will
generally be subject to copyright protection both in that country, as well
as under Berne. This naturally causes problems for a developing nation,
which is generally deficient in the foreign currency that is needed to buy
stocks of these works, or to purchase authorization to reproduce,
translate, or otherwise utilize them for their purposes.
SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE
BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 881–82 (2d ed. 2005). Another commentator observed:
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was whether they should accept the international treaty obligations that
the former controlling powers had entered on their behalf.97 Until then,
these countries did not have an independent voice, and their
international treaty arrangements were decided without much of their
participation.98
The question about succession to existing international intellectual
property obligations99 has serious ramifications for both the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works100 (“Berne
Convention”) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
[I]t should be pointed out that one of the long-range aims of all these
developing countries was to educate, as quickly as possible, the masses of
their illiterate peoples. Moreover, most of them realized that the quickest
way to accomplish this end was through the use of copyrighted materials,
primarily textbooks, from the more advanced countries.
Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
91, 93 (1970).
97 As this Author noted in an earlier article:
When the Berne Convention was revised in Brussels in 1948, only India
and Pakistan participated as fully independent nations. While other less
developed countries were previously subject to the Berne provisions, the
Convention applied to them only by virtue of their status “as dependent
territories.” Once they became independent, they therefore began to
question the extant international copyright relationship—in particular,
whether they should continue as members of the Berne Convention in
their own right or whether they should withdraw from the Union. While
India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and many former French and Belgian
African colonies elected to remain bound by the Convention, Indonesia
decided to withdraw from the Union.
Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 471–72 (footnotes omitted).
98 As Ruth Okediji observed:
The [early period of European contact through trade with non-European
peoples] . . . was characterized predominantly by the extension of
intellectual property laws to the colonies for purposes associated
generally with the overarching colonial strategies of assimilation,
incorporation and control. It was also characterized by efforts to secure
national economic interests against other European countries in colonial
territories.
Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 315, 324–25 (2003); see also Ruth L. Gana (Okediji), The Myth of Development,
The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW
& POL’Y 315, 329 (1996) (“As colonies, developing countries were not signatories to the
early international intellectual property treaties although the treaty provisions often
extended to them through the colonial administration.”).
99 See generally Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong’s Succession to the
ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 53, 80–93 (2000) (discussing state succession to treaties).
100 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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Property101 (“Paris Convention”), the two predominant intellectual
property agreements incorporated by reference into the TRIPS
Agreement.102 Consider, for instance, the Berne Convention. Although
this Convention is now the predominant international copyright
agreement, it competed with the Universal Copyright Convention103
(“UCC”) for members in the 1950s and 1960s.104 The UCC is an
alternative copyright agreement that countries established under the
auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”) in September 1952 to entice the United States
and Latin American countries to join the international copyright
family.105
The UCC allows member states to retain formalities in the
copyright system, such as the deposit, notice, or registration
requirements106—a key issue for the United States before the adoption
of the 1976 Copyright Act.107 The instrument also provides members
101 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
102 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2.1 (“In respect of Parts II, III and IV of
this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the
Paris Convention (1967).”); id. art. 9.1 (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through
21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.”).
103 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (revised at Paris
July 24, 1971) [hereinafter UCC]. For discussions of the UCC, see generally ARPAD BOGSCH,
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY (1958); UNIVERSAL
COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED (Theodore R. Kupferman & Matthew Foner eds., 1955).
104 See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—
Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1061, 1065 (1968) (“What started out as
cooperation and coexistence between Berne and the U.C.C. has turned into polite but
fierce competition . . . .”).
105 See Peter Jaszi, A Garland of Reflections on Three International Copyright Topics, 8
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 53 (1989) (contending that the UCC “had been designed as a
sort of junior Berne Convention, with the specific objective of bringing the United States
and other recalcitrant nations into the fold”); Ringer, supra note 104, at 1061 (describing
the UCC as “a new ‘common denominator’ convention that was intended to establish a
minimum level of international copyright relations throughout the world, without
weakening or supplanting the Berne Convention”); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039,
1054 (2007) (“To entice the United States to join the international copyright family, the
[UNESCO] explored the creation of a middle-of-the-road treaty that would allow the
United States to participate without either lowering the existing Convention standards
or requiring the United States to offer the higher protection required by the
Convention.”).
106 UCC, supra note 103, art. III.
107 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 570 (7th ed. 2019) (“The
most significant change to American copyright law brought about by the Berne
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with greater flexibilities, such as the ability to introduce compulsory
translation licenses.108 In addition, the Convention counted among its
members the United States, which did not accede to the Berne Union
until November 1988.109 Thus, even though colonial arrangements had
made many developing countries part of the Berne Convention, and
these countries valued the prestige that a Berne membership would
provide,110 they found the UCC more appropriate for countries that
“wished to obtain protection for their works abroad but felt unable or
unwilling to accord to foreign works the high level of protection
required by the Berne Convention.”111
At that time, newly independent countries actively explored
whether they should decline the succession to, or withdraw from, the
Berne Convention and then move over to the UCC.112 Their potential
withdrawal greatly alarmed developed countries—both within and
outside the Berne Union.113 As Barbara Ringer, the former U.S. Register

Convention Implementation Act of 1988 amendments is the abrogation of required
notice for publicly distributed works on or after March 1, 1989.”); Ringer, supra note
104, at 1057 (noting that the abolition of formalities in the 1908 Berlin Act “made it
impossible for the United States to join the Berne Union without substantial changes in
its domestic law”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”).
108 See UCC, supra note 103, art. V(2).
109 See WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne Convention, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/ShowResults?search_what=
C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Jan. 14, 2022) [hereinafter Contracting Parties] (stating that
the United States acceded to the Berne Convention on November 16, 1988, and that the
Convention took effect on March 1, 1989).
110 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 889 (noting the interest of some
African states to join the Berne Convention in light of the fact that the Convention, “in
view of its longer history, was seen as the more prestigious instrument”); Ringer, supra
note 104, at 1068 (stating that “the Berne Union has the prestige and traditions that the
U.C.C. lacks”).
111 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 886.
112 See Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 474–75 (discussing the choice
confronting developing country members of the Berne Convention). The Berne
safeguard clause prohibited Berne members that had withdrawn from the Union from
benefiting from the UCC in countries that were both Berne and UCC members. UCC,
supra note 103, art. XVII & app. decl.; see also Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71,
at 475 (“Although this clause helped deter defection, it did not affect those countries that
had yet to join the [Berne] Union, including many less developed countries in Africa,
Asia, and the Americas.”).
113 At that time, the developed country members of the Berne Convention were
conflicted over whether they should welcome an influx of new developing country
members:
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of Copyrights, recalled, “[t]here was obviously a fear that . . . Berne
would become a moribund old gentlemen’s club.”114 Likewise, Eugene
Braderman, a longtime U.S. State Department official, noted the worries
about “a mass exodus of developing countries from Berne and into the
UCC.”115 These fears and worries were understandable. By the time the
Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm (“Stockholm
Conference”) was held in June and July 1967 to revise the Berne
Convention, the UCC had already attracted twenty-six developing
country members, with its total membership lagging behind the total
Berne membership by only two.116
In the end, the Berne members struck a compromise at the
Stockholm Conference to ensure that developing country members
could stay in the Convention without losing the more attractive features
provided by the UCC.117 A key development at that conference was the
establishment of the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries,118
which, if adopted, would have allowed developing countries to make
reservations to the Berne Convention in the areas of copyright duration
and reproduction, translation, and broadcasting licenses.119
On the one hand, they “saw the potential for encouraging these ‘new’
states to join and by doing so expand the realm of governance for
intellectual property, which would potentially benefit the export oriented
companies in their own national intellectual property-related sectors.”
The developed Berne members therefore were willing to offer
concessions as “sweeteners” to entice these countries to join the Union.
On the other hand, these members were reluctant to adopt those changes
to the Berne Convention that would be needed if they were to attract
newly independent states. Because these countries had fought hard to
raise the international copyright standards over the past eighty years,
these changes would be major setbacks and were deemed highly
undesirable.
Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 474 (footnotes omitted).
114 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 1066.
115 Eugene M. Braderman, International Copyright—A World View, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 147, 153 (1970).
116 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 886 (“As a generalization, the former
French African colonies and some of the former British Asian Dominions had preferred
Berne, while the UCC had attracted the Central and South American countries and a
number of former British dependent territories.”).
117 For discussions of the Stockholm Conference and the efforts to establish a special
protocol for developing countries, see generally RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at
879–963; Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 471–84.
118 Protocol Regarding Developing Countries to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14, 1967, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/
text/278720.
119 See Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in
Developing Countries [hereinafter Okediji, Sustainable Access], in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
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Despite the developing countries’ initial success and early
momentum, the Protocol failed to gain traction at the ratification stage
and faced strong opposition from France, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom—all major producers and exporters of copyrighted works.120
While Senegal, Pakistan, and Romania “ratified the Stockholm Protocol
in full,” Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Israel, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom “positively signaled their rejection
of the Revision.”121 To prevent what commentators have called a “crisis
in international copyright,”122 the Berne and UCC members met in Paris
in July 1971 to create parity in the developing countries’ obligations in
both conventions and to explore the development of a toned-down
version of the Stockholm Protocol to the Berne Convention.123 That
version became the optional Berne appendix that has now been
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.124
Today, the Berne Convention has 180 members.125 By contrast, the
UCC has become largely irrelevant. Until December 9, 2021, Cambodia
was the only UCC member that had not yet joined the Berne
Convention.126 With Cambodia finally ratifying the latter,127 all UCC
members are now members of the Berne Convention. Because Article
XVII of the UCC states that the instrument “shall not in any way affect

GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 142,
157 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS]. See generally Dorothy M. Schrader, Analysis of the Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 160 (1970) (providing a detailed
analysis of the Stockholm Protocol).
120 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 916; Ndene Ndiaye, The Berne
Convention and Developing Countries, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47, 51 (1986).
121 Okediji, Sustainable Access, supra note 119, at 157 & nn.54–55.
122 Braderman, supra note 115, at 157–58; Ringer, supra note 104, at 1051; Howard
D. Sacks, Crisis in International Copyright: The Protocol Regarding Developing Countries,
1969 J. BUS. L. 26.
123 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 96, at 956; Yu, Development Agendas, supra
note 71, at 481.
124 Berne Convention, supra note 100, app.
125 Contracting Parties, supra note 109.
126 Jørgen Blomqvist, Universal Copyright Convention—RIP, IPKAT (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/12/guest-post-universal-copyright.html.
127 See Contracting Parties, supra note 109.
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the provisions of the Berne Convention,”128 Cambodia’s membership to
the Berne Convention spelled the “final obsolescence” of the UCC.129
In the 1960s, similar development-related questions were raised in
the patent area and about the Paris Convention. While the scope of that
convention was arguably broader than that of the Berne Convention—
covering patents, trademarks, and a wide variety of other intellectual
property rights130—the Paris Convention was less threatening to
developing countries. Indeed, when the Convention was established,
the Netherlands and Switzerland131 were allowed to become founding
members even when they did not offer patent protection.132
In the 1960s, while developing countries were busy deliberating on
whether to stay in the Berne Convention, they also questioned whether
the international patent system would benefit them. In November 1961,
“Brazil and many other developing nations demanded for the first
time—within the UN system—rules on the protection of intellectual
property . . . favourable to their economic development, including
proper controls against abuse, thereby putting ‘development’ issues and
‘public interest concerns’ on the international [intellectual property]
agenda.”133
Against a background of dissatisfaction with the
international patent system, Brazil introduced a draft U.N. resolution
entitled The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to

128 UCC, supra note 103, art. XVII; see also id. app. decl. relating to art. XVII (c) (“The
Universal Copyright Convention shall not be applicable to the relationships among
countries of the Berne Union in so far as it relates to the protection of works having as
their country of origin, within the meaning of the Berne Convention, a country of the
Berne Union.”).
129 Blomqvist, supra note 126.
130 See Paris Convention, supra note 101, art. 1(2) (noting the coverage of “patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications
of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition”).
131 Although the Netherlands enacted patent law in 1817, it repealed the law in 1869.
Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J.
ECON. HIST. 1, 3–5 (1950). See generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL
PATENTS (1971) (discussing the Netherlands and Switzerland during the time when they
did not have a patent system while nearly all other industrialized countries had such a
system in place).
132 See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 857 (2007)
(“[Members of the Paris Convention] could . . . determine whether they wanted to
protect patents in the first place. In the case of the Netherlands and Switzerland, for
example, the contracting members . . . allowed them to join the Convention without even
implementing patent protection.”).
133 Andrea Koury Menescal, Changing WIPO’s Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda
in Historical Perspective, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 761, 761–62 (2005).
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Underdeveloped Countries,134 which was also sponsored by Argentina,
Austria, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Iraq,
and Nigeria.135 Adopted the next month, the resolution requested the
U.N. Secretary General to prepare a report studying “the effects of
patents on the economy of under-developed countries.”136
Three years later, UNCTAD was established, also in response to
heavy pressure from developing countries.137 The agency’s origin can
be traced back to the U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and
Technology for Development in Geneva in February 1963.138 As Susan
Sell recounted:
This conference affirmed the developing countries’ belief that
the United Nations could help them in their quest for greater
access to technology. . . . [T]he conference’s most important
outcome was the conviction that the United Nations had a
central role to play “to facilitate the transfer of science and
technology to developing countries and to help developing
countries overcome obstacles in their access to necessary
knowledge and its effective application.”139
While already quite assertive in the 1960s, developing countries
received a new-found momentum following the oil crisis brought about
by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent embargo imposed by
the Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC).140 In May 1974, these countries successfully pushed
for the establishment of the New International Economic Order,141
See id. at 765 (discussing the resolution).
U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/6193 (1965).
136 G.A. Res. 1713 (XVI), The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to
Underdeveloped Countries (Dec. 19, 1961). The report was published in 1964. U.N.
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS., THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (1964).
137 SELL, supra note 71, at 67.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Essam E. Galal, The Developing Countries’ Quest for a Code, in INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 71, at 199, 200 (noting, in relation to the drafting of the
TOT Code, “the political tensions during this period of the cold war, the Arab-Israeli War
in 1973 being one example, as well as the economic tension as a result of the oil embargo,
the oil crisis and the obligatory recycling of its funds to the supposed victims of the
crisis”); Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 561–62 (noting that those
negotiations “were . . . colored by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the oil crisis” (footnote
omitted)).
141 G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (May 1, 1974). For discussions of the New International Economic
134
135
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which “sought to bring about fundamental changes in the international
economic system by redistributing power, wealth, and resources from
the developed North to the less developed South.”142 As Chantal Thomas
recounted:
The origins of [the momentum to establish this new economic
order] lay in three changes to the international order in the
postwar era: first, the “massive expansion of international
organization for cooperative purposes”; second, the “growing
importance of states representing non-Western civilizations”
in the wake of decolonization and independence movements;
and third, “the growing gap between the economically
developed and the economically less developed countries.”143
Building on this momentum, developing countries pushed for the
establishment of new multilateral norms to facilitate international
transfer of technology. In fall 1977, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
a resolution calling for “a United Nations conference to negotiate and to
take all decisions necessary for the adoption of an international code of
conduct on the transfer of technology under the auspices of
[UNCTAD].”144 The Code was “drafted on the assumption that transfer
of technology to developing countries is desirable and that the transfer
process will increase the prosperity of developing countries.”145
Formally began in October 1978,146 the negotiations reflected the
developing countries’ frustration that “transfer of technology contracts
often . . . involve[d] packaged transfer of previously developed
technology, unsuitable to the[ir] needs.”147
A key objective of the TOT Code was “to eliminate those clauses in
transfer of technology contracts which [were] harmful to the economic
development of developing countries” as well as other restrictive

Order and related issues, see generally MOHAMMED BEDAJOUI, TOWARDS A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD
AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1977).
142 Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 500.
143 Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the Contemporary International Order,
22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2096, 2105 (1999).
144 G.A. Res. 32/188, United Nations Conference on an International Code of Conduct
on the Transfer of Technology, art. 1 (Dec. 19, 1977).
145 Ton J.M. Zuijdwijk, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 24
MCGILL L.J. 562, 564 (1978).
146 SELL, supra note 71, at 89.
147 Countess Pease Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of Technology an Evaluation of the
UNCTAD Code of Conduct, 18 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 309, 312 (1977).
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foreign investment practices.148 Examples of these detrimental
practices included:
(1) grant-back provisions; (2) challenges to validity; (3)
exclusive dealing; (4) restrictions on research; (5) restrictions
on use of personnel; (6) price fixing; (7) restrictions on
adaptations; (8) exclusive sales or representation
agreements; (9) tying arrangements; (10) export restrictions;
(11) patent-pool or cross-licensing agreements; (12)
restrictions on publicity; (13) payments and other obligations
after expiration of industrial property rights; and (14)
restrictions after expirations of arrangements.149
Some of these restrictive practices, including those mentioned in the
previous Part,150 remain relevant even today.151
Despite the high hopes and ambitious goals, the TOT Code “was
troubled from the very beginning,” and the UNCTAD negotiations
proceeded very slowly.152 Among the more contested issues were “(1)
whether the character of the code should be binding or voluntary; (2)
chapter 1 of the code (definition and scope of application); (3) chapter

Zuijdwijk, supra note 145, at 563–64.
SELL, supra note 71, at 93; see also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE ROLE OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 54–63 (1974)
(discussing the abuses in patent licensing agreements and regulatory practices);
BLAKENEY, supra note 33, at 149–50 (discussing other practices that developing countries
proposed for inclusion); Yu, International Technology Contracts, supra note 71, at 44
n.12 (listing other restrictive business practices proposed by developing countries but
rejected by other negotiating parties).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 67–75.
151 See Peter K. Yu, Development Bridge over Troubled Intellectual Property Water, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERFACES—LIBER AMICORUM
PEDRO ROFFE 97, 103 (Carlos Correa & Xavier Seuba eds., 2019) (“[S]ome of these
decades-old anticompetitive practices that stifle global development may emerge in
new areas, such as in regard to the licensing arrangements concerning the acquisition,
transfer or diffusion of climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies.”); Yu,
International Technology Contracts, supra note 71, at 44 (noting the resemblance
between some of the restrictive business practices in the TOT Code and some of today’s
restrictive business practices and stating that “[t]he main difference between
international technology contracts at the time of the UNCTAD Code negotiations and
today is that these contracts were signed with firms or government agencies in
developing countries, as opposed to private individuals in those countries”);
Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Pedro Roffe, Unpacking the International Technology
Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond 15 (ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Tech. &
Intell. Prop., Issue Paper No. 36, 2012) (“[T]he issues raised by the Code and the
unresolved questions that led to its collapse often reverberate in almost all subsequent
international negotiations and discussions on technology transfer.”).
152 Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 497.
148
149
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4 of the code (restrictive business practices); and (4) chapter 9 of the
code (applicable law and the settlement of disputes).”153 Although some
progress had been made, the negotiations were eventually forestalled
by the arrival of the Reagan administration in the United States, the debt
crises in Latin America in the late 1980s, bureaucratic issues within
UNCTAD, and other factors relating to the changing geopolitical,
economic, and technological environments.154
The negotiations
stopped in June 1985, although UNCTAD continued to hold
consultations until the early 1990s.155
153 SELL, supra note 71, at 89. For detailed discussions of the draft Code, see generally
id. at 90–96; Thompson, supra note 35.
154 As Susan Sell recounted:
The eventual failure of the conference to agree upon a satisfactory code
was due to three factors: changes in U.S. leadership; bureaucratic factors
(the group system in UNCTAD and a loss of faith in the organization); and
changes in the world economic situation (a precipitous drop in foreign
investment, the Third World debt crisis, and subsequent pressure to
sacrifice ideological concerns for a more highly competitive environment,
which led Third World policymakers to more aggressively seek foreign
investment rather than strictly control it) . . . .
While the failure of the conference was due to changes in U.S.
leadership and bureaucratic factors, this third factor—the economic
slump of the late 1970s and early 1980s—was the most important. It was
the strongest shock to the optimism of the Group of 77’s member states.
Not only did it take the wind out [of] their sails, but it led them to abandon
the whole ship.
SELL, supra note 71, at 97–98, 105–06; see also Hanns Ullrich, Competition, Intellectual
Property Rights and Transfer of Technology, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra
note 71, at 363, 363–64 (“The reason for this failure are manifold: divergences from the
antitrust law concepts of major industrialized nations as regards restrictive exploitation
of intellectual property; general trends to liberalize not only markets but also antitrust
as a form of market regulation; the decline of the bargaining position of developing
countries; the shift of technology transfer to other mechanisms than licensing; and a
complete change in perception of intellectual property.”); Thomas, supra note 143, at
2108 (“With the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, . . . whatever momentum
remained in the[] efforts [to complete the TOT Code] dwindled along with the NIEO
movement more generally.”).
155 See UNCTAD Secretariat, The Status of the Negotiations: A 1990 Evaluation, in
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 71, at 139, 144 (“Since 1978, six sessions
of the [U.N. Conference on an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology] have been held, the last of which was from 13 May to 5 June 1985.”
(footnote omitted)); id. at 146 (“Since the last session of [this] Conference[,] . . . the
Secretary-General of UNCTAD and the President of the [Conference] have held
consultations with regional groups and interested governments with the objective of
delineating the scope of the issues outstanding in the draft Code and undertaking a quest
for appropriate solutions.”); Yu, International Technology Contracts, supra note 71, at 52
(noting that “UNCTAD continued to hold consultations until 1992”). As Professor Sell
recounted:
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Shortly after the GATT Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, in September 1986,156 countries began to shift their attention
toward the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.157 Although developing
countries did not have much success in getting the Agreement to
incorporate their preferred intellectual property standards, they did
manage to transplant a number of draft provisions of the TOT Code on
to the Agreement.158 These provisions became Articles 7, 8, 31(k), and
40.159 As the previous Part noted, Article 40 is one of the TRIPS
provisions that could pose a major challenge to the United States’ WTO
complaint against China over the issue of forced technology transfer.160
Also worth noting in the TRIPS context and in relation to the NorthSouth technology transfer debate, though less relevant to a developing
country like China, is the least-developed countries’ continuous
There was considerable progress on several difficult issues during the
first three sessions, but after 1981 the mood of the conference quickly
became one of disillusionment and frustration. The last three sessions
were characterized by heightened ideological rhetoric, a hardening of
positions on both sides, and stonewalling tactics. . . . By the sixth session
in May 1985, positions on both sides had been hardened to the point of no
return. Not only was Group B thoroughly intransigent, but the Group of
77 consensus had vanished.
SELL, supra note 71, at 89, 98; see also Galal, supra note 140, at 204–08 (discussing the
breakdown of the 1983 Code Conference).
156 See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 979, 982–84 (2009) (discussing the ministerial conference and the Punta del Este
Declaration, which included a section on “trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, including trade in counterfeit goods”); see also Gen. Agreement on Tariffs &
Trade, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623,
1626 (1986) (setting out the negotiating objectives of the TRIPS Agreement).
157 See Abbott, Technology Governance, supra note 6, at 197–98 (“The WTO TRIPS
Agreement strengthened IP rules on a multilateral basis and was in large measure a
rejection of NIEO demands. The TRIPS Agreement made only cursory reference to
transfer of technology.” (footnote omitted)).
158 See Pedro Roffe & Christoph Spennemann, Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in
Contractual Licenses Under the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 359, 382 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A.
Yusuf eds., 3d ed. 2016) (pointing out that inclusion of the TOT Code’s language in the
TRIPS Agreement is important because “restrictive practices . . . were peripheral to the
main objectives pursued by the advocates of the TRIPS Agreement”); Abdulqawi A.
Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra, at 3, 10 & n.19 (recounting that some of the provisions
in the developing countries’ negotiation text “were either directly based on or inspired
by those of the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology which
was negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD but was never adopted as an
international instrument” (citation omitted)).
159 See Yu, Development Agendas, supra note 71, at 503–04.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.
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frustration over the developed countries’ failure to fulfill their
technology transfer obligations under the WTO.161 Article 66.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement explicitly states that “[d]eveloped country Members
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology
transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base.”162 Despite this explicit
obligation, least-developed countries have received limited technology
transfer other than occasional legal and technical assistance.163 It is
therefore no surprise that developing and least-developed countries felt
compelled to push for a clarification of Article 66.2 in the Fourth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. Paragraph 11.2 of the Ministerial
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns states
explicitly that “the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are
mandatory.”164 The decision further required the TRIPS Council to “put

161 Least-developed countries are the world’s poorest countries. About LDCs, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-least-developed-countries (last
visited Feb. 20, 2022).
162 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 66.2.
163 See Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to
Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 119, at 227, 251 (“[Least
developed countries] have repeatedly noted at the Council for TRIPS that little or no
action has been taken by developed countries to specifically implement their obligations
under article 66.2.”); Andrew Michaels, International Technology Transfer and TRIPS
Article 66.2: Can Global Administrative Law Help Least-Developed Countries Get What
They Bargained for?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 223, 224 (2009) (“[I]mplementation of Article 66.2
thus far has been moderately successful at best.”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’
Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 526 (2011) (“[D]eveloped countries thus far have only
paid lip service to these obligations, with some undoubtedly subscribing to the view that
these obligations are merely aspirational.”); Keith E. Maskus, Encouraging International
Technology Transfer 15 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper
No. 7, 2004) (“Many developing countries have complained for a long time that the flows
of [international technology transfers] through private channels are inadequate for
their competitive and social needs. Implicitly the claim is that the volume (and quality)
of technology transfers is well below optimal.”); see also Michaels, supra, at 230
(“[A]ssistance as required by Article 67 is probably not sufficient to implement Article
66.2.”).
164 World Trade Org., Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns: Decision of 14
November 2001, ¶ 11.2, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter World
Trade Org., Implementation-Related Issues]; see also World Trade Org., Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 7, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002) (“We reaffirm the commitment of developedcountry members to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote
and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country members pursuant to
Article 66.2.”).
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in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full
implementation of the obligations in question.”165
Even with this explicit language, it remains unclear what the
technology transfer obligation would entail. Indeed, a key challenge
concerning this obligation has always involved the developing
countries’ need to know what they want.166 When developed countries
provide developing countries with technical assistance programs, the
latter need to exercise caution to make sure that these programs do not
become the tools for transplanting high protection and enforcement
standards from the developed world.167 Developing countries should
also take advantage of these programs to learn how to better use the
intellectual property system to improve their economic and
technological conditions.168
In sum, the North-South technology transfer debate has been
contentious for decades before China joined the WTO. While developed
World Trade Org., Implementation-Related Issues, supra note 164.
Cf. Michaels, supra note 163, at 224 (“Because Article 66.2 does not specify what
type of incentives must be created, or how effective these incentives must be, developed
countries have essentially been left to implement the provision, or not, as they see fit.”).
167 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 181 (2009) (“In the
realm of TRIPS implementation, capacity-building was rarely just a ‘technical’ matter. . . .
On the economic front, capacity-building was often used to ‘buy’ stronger IP
administration and enforcement in developing countries.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (“[T]he
countries in a position to provide assistance do so on their own terms; that is, they help
implement highly protectionist regimes, without regard for the actual needs of
developing nations.”); Christopher May, Capacity Building and the (Re)production of
Intellectual Property Rights, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821, 822 (2004) (“[C]apacity building for
IPRs [intellectual property rights] . . . may . . . lead to effective ‘epistemic lock-in’:
capacity building programmes socialise policy makers, practitioners and others into a
specific way of dealing with, and regulating, IPRs. It encourages the development of a
TRIPs mind-set.”); Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a
Mega-Regional Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 109 (2017)
(“Oftentimes, . . . ‘best practices’ are introduced [by technical assistance experts]
without regard to a particular country’s local needs, interests, conditions, or
priorities.”).
168 As this Author noted in an earlier article:
[M]any developed countries, industry groups, and international donor
organizations have actively provided technical assistance programs.
However, many of these programs are narrowly conceived, and they tend
to ignore the divergent local conditions in developing countries. Equally
questionable is the effectiveness of these programs in helping to build
local capacity, as opposed to adopting standards preferred by those
providing assistance.
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 278 (2012)
(footnotes omitted).
165
166
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countries and their supportive industries have heavily criticized the
developing countries’ technology transfer measures as attempts to
undermine intellectual property protection, the contextual reflections
provided in this Part show that the debate on international transfer of
technology is far from black and white. Instead, it is filled with many
shades of gray and features a wide array of positions and perspectives.
As Peter Jaszi insightfully noted shortly after the Berne Convention took
effect in the United States, “[o]ne might say that one nation’s ‘piracy,’ is
another man’s ‘technology transfer.’”169
IV. A COVID-19 REASSESSMENT
In winter 2019, countries became concerned about a new virus
known as SARS-CoV-2, which first emerged in China and has since
spread to Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world.170 In
January 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19
disease “a public health emergency of international concern.”171 Two
months later, the international health body classified it as a global
pandemic.172 For the past two years, the pandemic has wreaked havoc
throughout the world, costing millions of human lives173 and tens of
trillions of dollars.174
Jaszi, supra note 105, at 63.
See Press Release, World Health Org., Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China
Disease Outbreak News (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/; WHO Director-General’s Opening
Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19—11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020
[hereinafter WHO DG’s Opening Remarks].
171 WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/
director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihremergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov).
172 See WHO DG’s Opening Remarks, supra note 170.
173 See WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://
covid19.who.int (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (stating that COVID-19 has taken more than
six million lives).
174 See David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The COVID-19 Pandemic and the $16
Trillion Virus, 324 JAMA 1495, 1495 (2020) (estimating that the total cumulative
financial costs of the COVID-19 pandemic relating to the lost output and health reduction
at more than $16 trillion); Australian Nat’l Univ., Economic Pain: COVID-19 Pandemic
Will Cost Global Economy $21 Trillion, SCI. TECH. DAILY (July 5, 2020), https://
scitechdaily.com/economic-pain-covid-19-pandemic-will-cost-global-economy-21trillion/ (providing a July 2020 estimate that the pandemic’s global economic toll could
reach as high as $21 trillion); Shahar Ziv, Coronavirus Pandemic Will Cost U.S. Economy
$8 Trillion, FORBES (June 2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shaharziv/2020/06/
169
170
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To address the global pandemic, policymakers and commentators
have advanced different proposals, both within and outside the TRIPS
Agreement.175 Within the Agreement, the proposals have called for a
greater use of flexibilities. For instance, Article 31 stipulates the
conditions under which member states can issue compulsory licenses—
or, in TRIPS language, use patents “without the authorization of the right
holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by
the government.”176 Article 31bis allows members with insufficient or
no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of patented
pharmaceuticals.177 Article 73 provides a national security exception
that enables member states to protect their “essential security interests”
in times of “emergency in international relations.”178 At the time of
writing, three countries—Israel, Hungary, and Russia—have issued
compulsory licenses to combat COVID-19.179
One proposal that has gone beyond the flexibilities provided in the
TRIPS Agreement involves the COVID-19 TRIPS waiver. In October
2020, India and South Africa submitted an unprecedented proposal to
the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Council”), calling for a temporary waiver to address the global

02/coronavirus-pandemic-will-cost-us-economy-8-trillion/#5ce83d7c15e4
(estimating that “the pandemic would cost $7.9 trillion in real economic output, or a
staggering $16 trillion over the next 10 years without adjusting for inflation”).
175 Among the more notable efforts developed outside the WTO were the COVID-19
Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), the Open COVID Pledge, the Access to COVID-19 Tools
Accelerator, and its COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Initiative. See Peter K.
Yu, Modalities, Challenges, and Possibilities: An Introduction to the Pharmaceutical
Innovation Symposium, 7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 1, 32–40 (2021) (discussing these efforts).
176 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 31.
177 Id. art. 31bis.
178 Id. art. 73.
179 See Behrang Kianzad & Jakob Wested, “No-One Is Safe Until Everyone Is Safe”—
Patent Waiver, Compulsory Licensing and COVID-19, 5 EUR. PHARM. L. REV. 71, 74 (2021);
Compulsory Licenses, the TRIPS Waiver and Access to Covid 19 Medical Technologies 5–6,
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (May 26, 2021), https://msfaccess.org/compulsory-licensestrips-waiver-and-access-covid-19-medical-technologies.

YU (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/8/22 10:57 AM

FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

1041

pandemic.180 Slightly revised in May 2021,181 the proposal calls for the
suspension of Sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement
and related enforcement obligations under Part III “in relation to
prevention, containment or treatment of COVID-19.”182 Although
commentators frequently discussed the waiver proposal in relation to
patents and vaccines, the proposal also covers copyrights, industrial
designs, the protection of undisclosed information, and many other
COVID-19 products and technologies.183

Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts. [TRIPS Council], Waiver
from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and
Treatment of COVID-19: Communication from India and South Africa, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/669 (Oct. 2, 2020) [hereinafter TRIPS Waiver Proposal]. For discussions of the
COVID-19 TRIPS waiver proposal, see generally Peter K. Yu, A Critical Appraisal of the
COVID-19 TRIPS Waiver, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE POST PANDEMIC WORLD: AN
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF SUSTAINABILITY, INNOVATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Taina E.
Pihlajarinne et al. eds., forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Yu, Critical Appraisal]; Bryan
Mercurio, WTO Waiver from Intellectual Property Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines and
Treatments: A Critical Review, 62 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 9 (2021); Siva Thambisetty et al.,
Addressing Vaccine Inequity During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The TRIPS Intellectual
Property Waiver Proposal & Beyond, 81 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2022),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/113802/1/MCDONAGH_CLJ_accepted_submission_2022_002_.
pdf; Carlos M. Correa et al., Implementation of a TRIPS Waiver for Health Technologies
and Products for COVID-19: Preventing Claims Under Free Trade and Investment
Agreements (S. Ctr., Rsch. Paper No. 135, 2021); Reto M. Hilty et al., Covid-19 and the Role
of Intellectual Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition of 7 May 2021 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Rsch. Paper
No. 21-13, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841549; Srividhya Ragavan, Waive IP
Rights & Save Lives (S. Ctr., Southviews No. 231, 2021); Yousuf Vawda, The TRIPS COVID19 Waiver, Challenges for Africa and Decolonizing Intellectual Property (S. Ctr., Pol’y Brief
No. 99, 2021).
181 The proposal was revised following the Biden administration’s announcement of
its support for text-based negotiations for vaccines. Statement from Ambassador
Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 Trips Waiver, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (May 5, 2021),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/
statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver (“The Administration
believes strongly in intellectual property protections, but in service of ending this
pandemic, supports the waiver of those protections for COVID-19 vaccines. We will
actively participate in text-based negotiations at the World Trade Organization . . .
needed to make that happen.”).
182 TRIPS Council, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the
Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19: Communication from India and
South Africa, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/669/Rev.1 (May 21, 2021).
183 Paragraph 1 of the waiver proposal states:
The obligations of Members to implement or apply Sections 1, 4, 5 and 7
of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce these Sections under Part
III of the TRIPS Agreement, shall be waived in relation to health products
and technologies including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical
devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components,
180
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In forthcoming work, this Author have critically assessed the
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed waiver,184 explored
developments relating to China,185 and identified the different
pandemic-related paradoxes in intellectual property law and policy.186
Instead of rehashing those discussions, this Part focuses on how the
developed countries’ opposition to the COVID-19 TRIPS waiver can
inform our understanding of the challenges and complexities in the U.S.China forced technology transfer dispute.
A key strength of the proposed waiver is its ability to go beyond the
compulsory licensing arrangements under Articles 31 and 31bis of the
TRIPS Agreement to cover trade secrets, industrial designs, and other
forms of intellectual property rights.187 Such coverage is important
considering that many of the technologies necessary to combat COVID19 involve intellectual property rights outside the patent area.188 Except
for a few obligations in the optional Berne Appendix,189 the TRIPS
Agreement does not explicitly allow WTO members to issue compulsory
licenses in other areas of intellectual property law.190 The proponents
and their methods and means of manufacture for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19.
TRIPS Waiver Proposal, supra note 180, ¶ 1.
184 Yu, Critical Appraisal, supra note 180.
185 Peter K. Yu, China, the TRIPS Waiver and the Global Pandemic Response, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COVID-19, AND THE NEXT PANDEMIC: DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS,
DEVELOPING CURES (Madhavi Sunder & Sun Haochen eds., forthcoming 2022).
186 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Paradoxes in Pandemic Times, 71 GRUR INT’L 293
(2022).
187 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 31, 31bis (limiting compulsory licensing
arrangements to patents).
188 As India explained before the TRIPS Council:
[W]e have included four sections of TRIPS Agreement namely patents,
copyrights, industrial designs and undisclosed information or trade
secrets, in our proposal. This is because the health products and
technologies like test kits, masks, medicines, vaccines, components of
ventilators like valves, control mechanisms and the algorithms and CAD
files used in their manufacturing are protected by these four types of IPRs.
TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 15–16 October
and 10 December 2020, ¶ 871, IP/C/M/96/Add.1 (Feb. 16, 2021).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.
190 It remains debatable whether such arrangements exist in the area of trade secrets.
See Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities and the Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 641, 665–66 (2019) (noting the debate concerning whether WTO members can
utilize the test or other data submitted to regulatory authorities for the purposes of
granting marketing approval of pharmaceutical products that have been, or are to be,
issued under compulsory licenses and whether these members can waive data
exclusivity protection upon the issuance of such licenses); see also CARLOS M. CORREA,
TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS
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of the waiver therefore hope that the proposed instrument will give
WTO members more flexibilities and policy space while facilitating the
greater and quicker transfer of COVID-19 technology.191
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have widely agreed that
the waiver alone will not be sufficient to induce rights holders to
publicly disclose trade secrets, know-how, regulatory data, and other
proprietary information. Drawing on the example of penicillin
production during the Second World War, some commentators
contended that countries could effectively use carrots and sticks to
induce rights holders to scale up production through cooperation.192 A
few commentators have taken even stronger positions about the
imperative in mandating the transfer of technology, which would result
in involuntary transfers.193
Nevertheless, unless governments
AGREEMENT 374 (2d ed. 2020) (“Under [the exceptions provided in Article 39.3],
disclosure would be permissible . . . to allow a compulsory licensee to obtain a marketing
approval, particularly when the licence is aimed at remedying anti-competitive
practices or at satisfying public health needs.”); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS
REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 649–51 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that “[t]he fact that Article 39.3
does not refer to compulsory licenses does not mean that it prohibits them” and listing
the provisions on compulsory licenses of test data in Brazilian and Saudi Arabian
legislation); Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151, 168–74 (Pedro
Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products
and the development of a compulsory licensing system for registration data); Ellen F.M.
‘t Hoen et al., Data Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing to Promote Generic
Medicines in the European Union: A Proposal for Greater Coherence in European
Pharmaceutical Legislation, 10 J. PHARM. POL’Y & PRAC. no. 19, 2017, at 6, https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5490222/ (“The right of governments to
grant compulsory licences, including for public non-commercial use, is acknowledged in
international law, including in TRIPS. Effective use of such licences requires a waiver of
data exclusivity for the approval and marketing of licensed generic medicines.”).
191 See Yu, Critical Appraisal, supra note 180 (“[T]he proposed waiver will enable
policymakers to maximise their policy space at the intersection of intellectual property
and public health.”); Thambisetty et al., supra note 180 (manuscript at 3–4) (“[T]he
[TRIPS] waiver offers a necessary and proportionate legal measure for clearing IP
barriers in a direct, consistent and efficient fashion. If adopted it would provide
companies the freedom to operate and to produce COVID-19 vaccines (and other COVID19 health technologies) without the fear of infringing another party’s IP rights and the
attendant threat of litigation.”).
192 See Thambisetty et al., supra note 180 (manuscript at 22) (“A combination of
incentives and mandates to achieve technology transfer is precisely what happened in
the 1940s when, in a wartime situation and with no time to lose, the US Office of
Scientific Research and Development oversaw the pooling of technology which resulted
in a massive and rapid scale-up of penicillin production.”).
193 As Yousuf Vawda observed:
Additional measures may be necessary to mandate, particularly high
income countries . . . which house the majority of relevant IPR holders, to
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introduce measures to force rights holders to transfer their intellectual
property assets, there remains a considerable gap between an
arrangement facilitating cooperation or the pooling of intellectual
property assets and one mandating the involuntary disclosure of
proprietary information.194
Although it remains to be seen whether the proposed waiver can
help countries secure access to the needed technology and
manufacturing know-how to combat COVID-19, the debate on the
proposed instrument has provided some helpful lessons that inform the
U.S.-China debate on forced technology transfer. First, like the
discussion in the previous Part, the strong support for the waiver has
shown that people do not always oppose the involuntary disclosure of
proprietary information, despite the seemingly black-and-white
positions painted in the USTR’s Section 301 reports and the EU and U.S.
WTO complaints.195 Indeed, it will not be surprising to find some of
those supporting the USTR’s actions to challenge China’s technology
transfer measures siding with the proponents of the COVID-19 TRIPS
waiver. Whether one finds the use of technology transfer measures
acceptable will likely depend on values, contexts, and self-interests.
Unlike the waiver, which seeks to benefit all members of the
international community by improving global health security, the
measures at issue in the U.S.-China forced technology transfer dispute
benefited mostly, if not only, China. It is therefore logical for those
outside the country to draw different conclusions even though both sets
of measures aim to promote technology transfer.
Second, the strong opposition to the COVID-19 TRIPS waiver
revealed the strong feelings people have about the measures inducing
the involuntary transfer of technology and know-how. Even amid the
global pandemic, with millions of human lives lost and many more at
risk, people still find such measures inappropriate. In lieu of
require such rights holders to disclose fully and commit to the transfer of
trade secrets, manufacturing know-how, and effect the necessary
technology transfer. The TRIPS Agreement enables such disclosure for
the protection of the public. Such countries may compel industry to
commit their IP and know-how to the C-TAP facility to enable rapid scaleup of vaccine and other health technologies, especially where
governments have invested substantial public funds in the development
of vaccines and other products.
Vawda, supra note 180, at 3 (footnote omitted).
194 See Yu, Critical Appraisal, supra note 180 (noting that it would be quite a leap to
go from trade secret protection to forced technology transfer and that many possibilities
exist between these two options).
195 See EU Complaint, supra note 14; Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 2; SECTION
301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 17; SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION UPDATE, supra note 21.
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involuntary technology transfers, the opponents of the waiver have
offered alternative suggestions ranging from increased vaccine
distribution to support for the development of local manufacturing
capacity.196 Their principled positions have shown the difficulty in
quickly resolving the U.S.-China forced technology transfer dispute.
Indeed, because the pandemic-time objections to the waiver have
little,197 if not nothing, to do with China, they make salient the strong
ideological resistance toward the involuntary transfer of technology.
Moreover, if the opponents of the waiver are unwilling to support such
transfer to combat a global health crisis, one can only imagine how these
individuals will assess the appropriateness of China’s technology
transfer measures.

196 As Alden Abbott, Adam Mossoff, Kristen Osenga, and Zvi Rosen observed in a
paper highly critical of the waiver proposal:
A legitimate, effective, and less problematic solution would be to remove
any regulatory blockades that are preventing the international trade and
distribution of existing vaccine doses. . . . To the extent there are any
surplus vaccine doses, the U.S. should release those extra doses to be
exported to all foreign countries that permit those vaccines to be used.
This would get “shots in arms” without harming Americans or the U.S.
intellectual property system.
Another policy the U.S. could enact that would have a positive effect
in distributing vaccines globally is to assist in the development and
maintenance of infrastructure and vaccine distribution capacities in
developing countries. . . .
Lastly, another option would be for the U.S. to actively consider
incentivizing developing countries to adopt cutting-edge technologies,
like the mRNA platform. Encouraging countries to build development and
manufacturing facilities for these technologies would help the countries
to support their own citizens’ needs going forward, and potentially make
it possible for these countries to participate in the race to develop
vaccines in the next pandemic.
Alden Abbott et al., COVID Vaccine IP Waiver: A Pathway to Fewer, Not More, Vaccines,
REGUL. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Oct. 28, 2021), https://regproject.org/paper/covidvaccine-ip-waiver-a-pathway-to-fewer-not-more-vaccines/.
197 Some did tie their objections to China. See Hannah Kuchler & Aime Williams, As
Industry Lobbying Has Escalated in Washington, Companies Have Warned in Private
Meetings, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/fa1e0d22-71f2-401f9971-fa27313570ab (“As industry lobbying has escalated in Washington, companies
have warned in private meetings with US trade and White House officials that giving up
the intellectual property rights could allow China and Russia to exploit platforms such
as mRNA, which could be used for other vaccines or even therapeutics for conditions
such as cancer and heart problems in the future.”); D. Ravi Kanth, Big Pharma to Block
TRIPS Waiver at WTO, Citing China & Russia, TWN INFO. SERV. ON WTO & TRADE ISSUES (Apr.
27, 2021), https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2021/ti210415.htm (reporting that
the pharmaceutical industry and their supportive politicians have used China and Russia
to explain why they oppose the waiver).
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Third, the disagreement over whether the forced disclosure of
trade secrets and other proprietary information could provide the
technologies and products needed to combat COVID-19 suggests that
policymakers and commentators may have overstated the effectiveness
of TIER, the EJV Regulations, and other measures implicated in the U.S.China forced technology transfer dispute. A key argument in the United
States’ WTO complaint is that China used these regulations to force U.S.
companies to disclose their valuable intellectual property assets. As we
have learned from the waiver debate, even if laws and regulations have
been enacted to mandate disclosure, it is unclear what information will
be disclosed and how valuable the disclosed information will be. If
forced disclosure is unlikely to work in the pandemic context, how can
we assume that such disclosure will work in the context of high-speed
rail, new energy vehicles, or other frontier technologies—areas that are
of great concern to U.S. policymakers and industries? To the extent that
there is evidence showing that TIER and the EJV Regulations have
induced the involuntary transfer of valuable technology and
information from U.S. companies to their local counterparts,
policymakers and commentators should further interrogate the causal
relationship. They should also explore whether, and how much, other
laws, policies, and practices have contributed to such transfer.198 These
follow-up inquiries are needed because the answers to these questions
may not lie in the text of TIER and the EJV Regulations.
In sum, the COVID-19 pandemic has added a new layer of
complexity that the earlier discussion of the North-South technology

198 See Prud’homme et al., supra note 6, at 163 (“Some FTT policies do not have much
leverage, and therefore spur only limited amounts of technology transfer. Some FTT
policies help spur transfer of technology but not frontier technology. Some FTT policies
do not spur any technology transfer at all, and at worst discourage technology
transfer.”); Mark Cohen, Towards a Better Understanding of “Forced Technology
Transfer” Policies in China and Their Strategic Implications, CHINA IPR (June 22, 2018),
https://chinaipr.com/2018/06/22/towards-a-better-understanding-of-forcedtechnology-transfer-policies-in-china-and-their-strategic-implications/ (noting that
technology transfer measures “may enable domestic acquisition of frontier foreign
technology . . . [or] may result in a lose-lose game where foreign firms are discouraged
from transferring valuable technology and domestic firms’ acquisition of new
technology is made more difficult,” depending on the implementation of those
measures); see also Nicholas R. Lardy, China: Forced Technology Transfer and Theft?,
CHINA ECON. WATCH (Apr. 20, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/chinaeconomic-watch/china-forced-technology-transfer-and-theft (“Overlooked [in the U.S.China debate on forced technology transfer] are the data that suggest the popular
narrative exaggerates the magnitude of China’s forced technology transfer and theft and
does not allow for the possibility that China’s protection of intellectual property is
improving rather than worsening.”).
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transfer debate has not revealed.199 By drawing contextual reflections
from these two debates, this Article hopes that readers will develop a
deeper understanding of the challenges and complexities in the U.S.China forced technology transfer dispute as well as the difficulties in
challenging technology transfer measures before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. If we can learn anything from these three debates, it
is that we do not yet have a consensus—at either the national or
international level—on whether technology transfer measures are
appropriate or when they should be allowed.
V. GOING FORWARD
The previous Parts have shown why it is difficult to address issues
relating to forced technology transfer. Such difficulty inevitably raises
questions about the effectiveness of the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO
dispute settlement process.200 Indeed, in the past few years, the United
States has repeatedly called for systemic reform at the international
trading body,201 even when it continues to use the WTO dispute
See discussion supra Part III.
See Lee, Shifting IP Battlegrounds, supra note 1, at 188 (suggesting that the WTO’s
inability to respond to state-backed outbound acquisition of equity and technologies and
cyber intrusions may indicate that “TRIPS and other international trade rules are
outdated”); Mark Cohen, US Suspends IP Case Against China at the WTO. Quo Vadis
Europa?, CHINA IPR (June 14, 2019), https://chinaipr.com/2019/06/14/us-suspendsip-case-against-china-at-the-wto-quo-vadis-europa/ [hereinafter Cohen, US Suspends IP
Case] (“Suspending the case [against China over the forced technology transfer dispute]
. . . in a sense confirms that Donald Trump accomplished legislative reform more quickly
with jaw-boning and tariffs than the WTO could have with dispute settlement
proceedings.”).
201 See Gen. Council, An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status Risks
Institutional Irrelevance: Communication from the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1 (Feb. 14, 2019) (expressing concern that the self-declaration of
development status has put the WTO on a path to failed negotiations and institutional
irrelevance); Gen. Council, Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen
Notification Requirements Under WTO Agreements: Communication from Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States,
WTO Doc. JOB/GC/204/Rev.3 JOB/CTG/14/Rev.3 (Mar. 5, 2020) (advancing a draft
General Council Decision on the Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen
Notification Requirements Under WTO Agreements); see also Gen. Council, China’s
Trade-Disruptive Economic Model: Communication from the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/745 (July 16, 2018) (registering concerns that China’s state-led, tradedisruptive economic model was inconsistent with the principles of non-discrimination,
market access, reciprocity, fairness, and transparency and that this model has imposed
substantial costs on and has presented severe challenges to other WTO Members); Gao,
WTO Reform, supra note 1, at 20–23 (discussing the proposals for WTO reforms
advanced by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the Ottawa Group). See
199
200
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settlement process.202 Nevertheless, to help intellectual property rights
holders and to avoid escalating tensions and conflicts, it will be useful to
explore how China and the United States can constructively move
forward from their forced technology transfer dispute. Considering the
wide variety of possibilities, this Part focuses on only those suggestions
that directly relate to this dispute.
To begin with, it is important to stay away from using the term
“forced technology transfer” as if it has a well-settled meaning in either
the intellectual property field or in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. Not
only is there no standard definition among governments, policymakers,
and commentators,203 it is also unclear whether the TRIPS Agreement
and its negotiating history will help or hurt those complaining about
technology transfer measures in China. Instead, the two countries
should unpack the different concerns and grievances that have been
lumped together under the umbrella of “forced technology transfer.”
Whether at the negotiation or dispute resolution stage, both China
and the United States will be in a better position to find solutions once
they have developed a better understanding of the specific problems
involved. For instance, it will be worthwhile to ask whether the
problems relate to the inadequate protection of trade secrets and
undisclosed regulatory data, the arrangements for Sino-American joint
ventures, or the extent of state intervention in the Chinese market.
While some of these issues will relate to intellectual property law, the
generally Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 261 (2016) (explaining why China’s rise and sui generis economic structure have
posed a major challenge to the WTO and its dispute settlement process).
202 See Cohen, US Suspends IP Case, supra note 200 (“By filing the [WTO] case
immediately after the 301 Report regarding technology transfer and innovation, the US
case seemed to be making the point that the WTO was still a viable mechanism for
certain of the US complaints regarding China’s technology transfer regime.”).
203 Unlike developing countries, whose views and demands Part III have
documented, developed countries conceptualize technology transfer very differently.
See, e.g., Negotiating Grp. on Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 30 October–2 November 1989,
¶ 61, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/16 (Dec. 4, 1989) (“[T]he representative of the United
States . . . believed [the protection of trade secrets was] important for developing
countries since there was no better way of encouraging the transfer of technology to
developing countries than to provide protection to trade secrets and proprietary
information which constituted the very essence of the transfer of technology.”); Working
Grp. on Trade & Transfer of Tech., Work of the Working Group Under the Auspices of the
General Council Pursuant to Paragraph 37 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration:
Communication from the European Communities, ¶ 18, WTO Doc. WT/WGTTT/1 (June
10, 2002) (“Where the technology in question is subject to intellectual property rights,
the transfer of this technology implies transfer of the legal rights to the technology in
question by selling patent rights or licensing the right to make use of the right.”).
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remainder will involve other WTO agreements or lie outside the
international trading body. In short, the problems and solutions
involved can vary quite significantly.
Once China and the United States have identified their concerns
and grievances, they can determine which one or more of the following
routes will best address the issues: (1) multilateral; (2) bilateral; or (3)
unilateral. The multilateral route is ideal for resolving disagreements
over issues that fall squarely within the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement,204 such as the protection of trade secrets and undisclosed
regulatory data under Article 39.205 Even if the two countries are
uncertain whether they can, or want to, resolve their disagreements at
the WTO dispute settlement process, those issues can be explored at the
TRIPS Council, in the ongoing discussions concerning WTO reform, or in
new rounds of WTO negotiations.206
Not all issues can be resolved multilaterally, however. Instead,
some will require direct negotiations between China and the United
States.207 To facilitate bilateral cooperation in addressing global
problems, which range from climate change to global economic
recovery, some commentators have suggested the use of the G-2 model.
As Fred Bergsten and his coauthors observed slightly more than a
decade ago:
It is now clear that an effective response to every major
international economic issue requires close cooperation
between [China and the United States]. There will be no
sustained recovery from the global economic crisis unless
[these countries] lead it and they have appropriately launched
by far the largest stimulus programs in the world. There will
be no renewed momentum toward trade liberalization
through the Doha Round or otherwise, a credible defense
against the protectionist pressures that have been intensified
204 Accord MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 27, at viii (“[R]ecommitting to
multilateralism is the only viable solution to extricate Beijing and Washington from their
trade conflict, which risks escalating in a full-blown war.”); Branstetter, supra note 3, at
4 (“Efforts to change China’s behavior should be limited, well targeted, and
multilateral.”).
205 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 39 (providing the international
minimum standards for the protection of undisclosed information).
206 See Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 311, 319–22, 329–32 (2011) (discussing efforts to recalibrate
the TRIPS Agreement and meetings at the TRIPS Council).
207 Accord Sykes, supra note 3, at 163 (suggesting the creation of a bilateral
investment treaty with China as a policy option to address issues relating to corporate
structure requirements that have led to forced technology transfer).
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by the crisis, unless they endorse it. There will be no
international cooperation on global warming unless they
embrace it. The United States is the world’s largest deficit and
debtor country, and China is the world’s largest surplus and
creditor country, and without their concurrence there will be
neither resolution of the global imbalances that helped bring
on the current crisis nor lasting reform of the international
financial architecture.208
Issues relating to cybersecurity and technology transfer will likely
benefit from greater bilateral engagement. Those issues are either
outside the scope of existing WTO agreements or left unresolved due to
a lack of consensus among WTO members.209 As we have seen from
recent multilateral and regional discussions,210 it is highly unlikely that

C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, at x-xi (2009);
see also Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global Economy, in
CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 7, 11 (DorothyGrace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) (describing “a chain-gang relationship”
between China and the United States in light of their growing economic
interdependence); Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, “Chimerica” and the Global Asset
Market Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215 (2007) (coining the term “Chimerica”). Professors
Mavroidis and Sapir disagreed:
A bilateral deal between China and the United States is neither realistic
nor desirable. It is unrealistic because the two parties are engaged in a
conflict that goes far beyond trade and neither will be ready to make
concessions to the other for fear that it will weaken its global geopolitical
standing. And it is undesirable because any bilateral trade deal that would
be acceptable to the two parties would inevitably come at the expense of
other countries.
MAVROIDIS & SAPIR, supra note 27, at viii; see also STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS:
HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 216–18
(2010) (arguing against elevating the US-China relationship to a special G-2 bilateral
partnership). See generally ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND AMERICA
BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT (2009) (discussing
the intertwined economic relationship between China and the United States).
209 See discussion supra Part III.
210 Some international agreements sought to create WTO-plus obligations relating to
transfer of technology in the investment context. For example, Article 9.10.1(f) of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which has since been incorporated by reference
into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
provides:
No Party shall, in connection with the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition
of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory,
impose or enforce any requirement, or enforce any commitment or
undertaking . . . to transfer a particular technology, a production process
or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory . . . .
208
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new multilateral arrangements will quickly emerge to resolve the
disagreements between China and the United States over these
issues.211
Finally, some issues can be addressed unilaterally, without the
participation of the other side. For example, it will be highly valuable
for U.S. companies entering or expanding the Chinese market to obtain
more knowledge about the business and regulatory environments in
China.212 These companies will also benefit from more information
about the different options to protect and enforce intellectual property
rights or to facilitate effective and equitable technology licensing.213
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate on international transfer of technology has been
around for decades. Because the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement have
not resolved this debate, the issues will not go away any time soon. To
some extent, one could view the U.S.-China forced technology transfer
dispute as one of the debate’s latest iterations. If the difficulties
surrounding the international debate is any guide, resolving the U.S.China dispute will not be quick and easy. With the ongoing rivalry
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 9.10.1(f), Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text.
211 See Correa, supra note 163, at 256 (“[T]he issues affecting the transfer of
technology to developing countries are unlikely to be resolved within the limited
contours of the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO disciplines.”). A good example of the
challenges that will arise at the WTO concerns the development of new digital trade
norms. See generally Mira Burri, Towards a New Treaty on Digital Trade, 55 J. WORLD
TRADE 1 (2021) (identifying the points of convergence and divergence in the WTO
members’ latest negotiation proposals and evaluating the feasibility of developing a new
treaty on digital trade); Henry Gao, Digital or Trade? The Contrasting Approaches of
China and US to Digital Trade, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 297 (2018) (discussing the contrasting
approaches taken by China and the United States to set digital trade norms).
212 See Dan Prud’homme & Max von Zedtwitz, The Changing Face of Innovation in
China, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (June 12, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/thechanging-face-of-innovation-in-china/ (identifying the new challenges to managing
foreign research and development in China and underscoring the need for these
companies to retool their strategies to keep pace with competition from local innovative
companies and the changing business and technological landscapes). See generally
HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA (2004) (identifying
ten myths about doing business in China).
213 See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 5, at 946–74 (discussing the
alternative ways to protect intellectual property assets in China even when intellectual
property laws were not effectively enforced); James Hexter & Sarena Lin, The Right Way
to Protect IP, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB112000243233972258 (“[M]any multinational companies in China are losing the
battle to protect their intellectual property, largely because they rely too heavily on legal
tactics and fail to factor IP properly into their strategic and operational decisions.”).
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between China and the United States in areas such as 5G, artificial
intelligence, robotics, data analytics, and biomedicine, the dispute will
only intensify, making the debate even more contentious.
By juxtaposing the U.S.-China forced technology transfer dispute
with the North-South technology transfer debate and the ongoing
opposition to the COVID-19 TRIPS waiver, this Article has shown that
the debate on international transfer of technology has been more
complex and less binary than policymakers and commentators have
assumed or are willing to admit. Policymakers and commentators
should therefore devote greater energy, effort, and resources to study
the challenges and complexities involved. The sooner they do so, the
quicker they will be able to come up with new or better solutions, and
the more successful they will be in minimizing tensions and conflicts
between China and the United States.

